NATO TROOP WITHDRAWALS

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NATO TROOP WITHDRAWALS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Lugar, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, and Glenn.

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee has convened this morning to receive testimony from Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on the subject of U.S. force structure in NATO. The hearing is intended to address a number of NATO-related issues that will be debated when the Senate takes up the fiscal year 1983 defense appropriations bill, including the question of unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals, matters related to burden-sharing and host nation support, and reciprocity in trans-Atlantic defense trade.

Earlier this month, Senator Pell and I attended the 28th annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in London. During the sessions, the question of the troop withdrawal proposed by the Appropriations Committee was a central point of discussion and concern among the parliamentarians representing NATO's 16 states.

As British Defense Secretary John Nott warned in a speech during the plenary session, "It is well to remember that it is not only numbers, but the perception of change, that is important. Any reduction which was perceived to cast doubt on the strength of the American commitment to Europe would serve only to weaken deterrence. It would be greatly welcomed by the Soviet Union, and that outcome could scarcely be in American interests."

On the final day of the session, the Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution presented by its Military Committee which urges all member governments to refrain from unilateral troop reductions or other actions which would weaken the conventional strength and political cohesion of the Alliance and lessen the prospects for success in current arms control negotiations.

As one who spoke in opposition to the Appropriations Committee proposal during the meetings of the Assembly's Military Committee, I welcome this forceful statement on the part of NATO's parliamentary organization and ask that it be printed in the record of this hearing.

[The statement referred to follows:]

[NOTE.—This resolution was unanimously adopted by the Assembly meeting in Plenary Session on November 18, 1982.]

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON ALLIANCE SECURITY PRESENTED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

The Assembly, aware that a credible and viable Alliance defence policy must be based upon the support and consensus of Alliance publics;

Concerned over the continuing modernization of Warsaw Pact armed forces, both conventional and nuclear, and the implications of this for the requirements of flexible response, especially in the area of conventional forces;

Noting that the issue of conventional defence has gained widespread attention recently, due largely to the public debate on the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy;

Noting that advances in conventional weapons technology, especially in the areas of guidance and target acquisition, offer the Alliance the potential to perform with conventional weapons many of the tasks previously assigned to nuclear weapons;

Convinced that rationalization of short-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe is both militarily and politically desirable, and must be accompanied by a corresponding strengthening of conventional defence capabilities;

Recognising, nonetheless, the vitally important deterrent role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy, including the option of 'first use' of nuclear weapons;

Convinced that continued modernization and maintenance of non-nuclear defence capability is of the highest priority in Alliance defence planning;

Concerned that at a time of severe budgetary limitations, strong pressures may exist in certain Alliance countries to emphasize particular national requirements at the expense of commitments to a credible conventional defence posture in the Alliance;

Urges all member governments:

(1) To examine thoroughly the opportunities afforded the Alliance by new conventional weapons technologies;

(2) To devote the resources necessary to achieve a significant improvement in the conventional capability of the Alliance, while simultaneously attempting to constrain through arms control the threat facing the Alliance;

(3) To refrain from unilateral troop reductions or other actions which would weaken the conventional strength and political cohesion of the Alliance and lessen the prospects for success in current arms control negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Eagleburger, we are looking forward to hearing the administration's position on these issues.

Before you testify, I would like to submit for the record the complete statement by General Bernard W. Rogers, Commander in Chief, United States European Command, and to indicate that General Rogers also attended and addressed the North Atlantic Assembly meeting and was very forthright in both the plenary session meetings and his private meetings with us on the matter of troop withdrawal. I have discussed that matter with him through the years and we did invite General Rogers to testify today.

As the highly respected Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and the man most directly charged with carrying out NATO's defense responsibilities in Western Europe, we especially value his perspective on the various NATO-related issues raised by the Appropriations Committee bill.

Today General Rogers is attending NATO meetings in Europe and could not be in Washington. He has provided the committee with written testimony, though. At this point I will ask unanimous consent that it be included in the record of the hearing. Copies of the full text are now available from the staff and have been made available to members of the press and to anyone else who would like to have a full text of General Rogers' statement.

[General Rogers' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the committee's invitation to testify regarding possible reductions in U.S. troop levels in Europe and other actions proposed by other committees of the Congress. I regret that prior commitments prevent my testifying in person.

I am aware of the budgetary constraints which have played a key role in the reductions that are proposed. However, irrespective of the reasons for these reductions, I wish to highlight their impact from the viewpoint of my international role as SACEUR. In my view, proposals to reduce U.S. troop commitments to Europe are faulty for a number of reasons. First, these proposals would seem not to recognize sufficiently that a free and independent Western Europe is the most important American vital interest outside our borders. Europe is the first line of defense for our nation and the values we treasure. Our defense expenditures for NATO are resources directly applied to our own well-being and security. Second, advocates of troop withdrawal generally underestimate the substantial contributions which Europeans are making to their own defense, such as the human and social costs of relying on conscription to man their forces and the "hidden" economic costs of the use of "free" European real estate for stationing and training allied forces. Third, these proposals seem to ignore that the manpower commitments of several allies and the non-U.S. NATO as a whole have actually increased in recent years. Fourth, the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops would have a major adverse impact on our MBFR negotiations; we would withdraw more than currently being negotiated with no *quid pro quo* from the Warsaw Pact. Such unilateral action, without consultation with Allies, would be viewed by them as ignoring the collective decision-making process which is so much a part of common defense procedures. Finally, U.S. troop withdrawals would undoubtedly provoke a decrease in European defense spending. To be sure, I do argue that the European members of the Alliance can and must support greater defense expenditures. However, the realities of today are such that larger increases would certainly not be supported if these nations perceived that the United States was reducing its commitments to them. Such a move would be counterproductive.

In many respects, American commitments provide the cement holding the Alliance together. Many persons, not fully understanding European attitudes, underestimate the fragility of the Alliance in this regard, despite recent evidence showing the ease with which NATO is susceptible to divisive influences. What they do not seem to realize is that, in Europe today, one of the greatest dangers to deterrence is the potential loss of political will to maintain the sacrifices required for security.

With the United States taking the lead, NATO continues to improve its military forces. However, although NATO gets stronger every year, the gap between force capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact gets wider each year, decreasing the credibility of our deterrent. Although the military situation is not yet unmanageable—we are a defensive Alliance and need not match the Pact one for one in any area of force comparison—we must resolve now to improve our conventional capacity before the situation does grow beyond restoration. The achievement of this objective would be impacted adversely by a reduction in U.S. force commitments to Europe.

Looking at specific proposals, a bill now before the Senate includes four measures which will be perceived by our Allies as reducing U.S. commitments to Europe:

1. To hold U.S. troop strength in Europe to 1980 levels.
2. To delete all funds for POMCUS (Prepositioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) division sets 5 and 6.
3. To cut $63 million from the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) program.
4. To eliminate funds for the Host Nation Support agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany.

I will address each of these issues separately.

The bill directs that the European troop ceiling be held to the actual fiscal year 1980 level of 331,700 as opposed to the Administration's request of 350,600 for fiscal year 1983. The additional personnel requested result from increasing Naval personnel by 13,000 and Air Force personnel by 9,800. The Army and Marine forces were planned to be reduced slightly under the administration proposal. The large increase in Naval personnel results from added anti-submarine warfare capability in the Atlantic and a greater U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, which at present is more aligned towards Southwest Asia than NATO.

With regard to the Air Force increases, some are for the modernization of our Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF): about 1,200 personnel are required to intro-

duce Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) into the theater. Without these personnel we will be unable to continue the deployments by which NATO plans to remedy the current gap in our spectrum of deterrence and to encourage the Soviets into serious negotiations.

Other Air Force personnel increases are required for us to do better with our currently deployed forces. At present, the programmed combat sortie rate of F-15's and F-16's is well below optimum due to maintenance procedures and personnel shortages. Just assigning the proper number of people to this current requirement accounts for 4,000 of the increase. Recent and planned deployments of NATO AWACS and TR-1 also account for more than 1,100 other personnel increases.

My second concern is the deletion of POMCUS funds for division sets 5 and 6. This item is critical for two reasons. Without those sets, the United States cannot hope to achieve its commitment to the goal of having 10 divisions and associated air squadrons in Europe by D-day. That requirement is minimal and is based upon the needs for reinforcement to counter the increasing threat. Without this minimal force the relative capability of the Warsaw Pact in the North German plain would be so overwhelming that we could not defend sucessfully without early use of nuclear weapons. We simply do not have the sealift or airlift to accomplish that reinforcement mission in the foreseeable future without six division sets in POMCUS. At present, we have aircraft to move the personnel for these units plus individual replacements and fillers. But without additional POMCUS there will be no equipment for these reinforcements to use.

A second reason for retaining these funds is the United States national commitment to POMCUS sets 5 to 6. In 1978 President Carter made such a commitment as a part of our Long Term Defense Program. As a direct result, NATO infrastructure funds were committed and the two host nations, Belgium and The Netherlands, purchased the land required and began construction. At present, three of the sites are nearing completion while construction will be initiated at the other three in the next few months.

To go back on our word at this point would undermine our efforts to get these nations to play their proper role. The two governments have committed large sums of money for the land and initial construction. For them to acquire the land in such populous countries was an unpopular issue, only begrudgingly offset by promises of permanent employment for those living near the sites. These sites cannot be simply diverted to other uses. They are designed specifically to store and maintain combat equipment for extended periods. The United States should not now back away from this important agreement.

I have already briefly mentioned GLCM, the third element of the suggested bill. By cutting $63 million from procurement we can achieve some budget savings, yet still meet our Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date. While that goal and the method are not unique, the outcome of such action in this case would have far reaching consequences. Most seriously, such a cut would appear to undermine the resolve of the United States and NATO to close the INF gap in our nuclear spectrum.

The Soviets do not want Pershing II and GLCM's deployed. They have launched a massive campaign using misinformation and tough rhetoric both here and in Europe in an attempt to lessen our will to implement the vital NATO decision of December 1979. Any sign that our resolve is weakening would damage our INF negotiating position and certainly would undermine the resolve of other NATO nations to continue their support for INF modernization.

On the budgetary side this cut will actually cost the United States additional procurement dollars in the long run. The current contract calls for 120 missiles, 22 erector/launchers, and 12 launch control vans. A $63 million cut would reduce these buys by nearly 20 percent. The difficulty is that in order to get the system at the agreed price, the Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Agreement with General Dynamics for a minimum buy. Should we buy fewer systems each year, added unit costs will be incurred. DOD's estimates are that this $63 million "savings" will ultimately cost the taxpayer $130 million, an increase of over 100 percent.

My final concern centers on the elimination of the funds for our Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany. In the last 10 years we have changed the "tooth to tail" ratio in our European forces. Initially, this was helpful, but we have gone too far. While attempting to increase our combat power within strength ceilings we have reached a point where there is insufficient combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) in theater to support deployed and deploying forces. Even our National Guard and Reserve units, heavily weighted with CS/CSS, will not be sufficient in the early weeks of a conflict to allow our combat units to sustain themselves. HNS agreements are a step toward correcting this defi-

ciency. The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to provide 93,000 Reservists (not now included in NATO assigned forces) to handle significant portions of our ammunition, equipment, transportation and security during mobilization and after hostilities commence. This support includes the personnel, trucks, handling equipment, railcars and facilities to offset our shortages. The U.S. part of this bargain is to provide that equipment not currently available in Germany to accomplish this mission for us. The price to fund the units themselves, their people, equipment, and the lift to get them into theater would be far greater than the amount being shared with the FRG.

The provisions of the bill will not cause our allies to increase their defense spending. They will cause the United States to lose credibility with other NATO nations at a critical time in their own decision processes for defense. They will reduce our own capability to deter Soviet aggression and risk taking, and they will impact unfavorably upon my ability as SACEUR to accomplish my mission. I am hopeful that some means can be found to provide the end-strength requested and to restore the funds deleted for Division Sets 5 and 6, for the GLCM program and for the U.S. share of the German HNS Agreement.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to lay this statement before you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like simply to summarize the following points which General Rogers emphasizes in his own testimony—first, that the proposal to reduce the U.S. troop commitments in Europe does not sufficiently recognize that a free and independent Western Europe is the most important American vital interest outside our own borders; second, that advocates of a troop reduction underestimate the substantial contributions which Europeans are making to their own defense; third, that the proposal ignores the fact that the manpower commitments by several allies and Europe as a whole have actually increased in recent years; fourth, that the proposal would have a major adverse impact on the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction [MBFR] talks; and, finally, that a unilateral U.S. troop reduction would undoubtedly provoke a decrease in European defense spending.

In his statement, General Rogers also argues against the action of the Appropriations Committee in deleting funds for POMCUS [Prepositioned Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets] division sets 5 and 6, the $63 million cut in the ground-launched cruise missile program and the elimination of funds for the host nation support agreement for the Federal Republic of Germany.

General Rogers makes a persuasive and forceful presentation in the statement that he has submitted to this committee, and I commend it to all of my colleagues.

Mr. Secretary, the subject of troop withdrawals is not a new subject for this committee. Regretfully, when I first came on the committee 10 years ago, I found myself in confrontation with one of my most beloved colleagues, Senator Mansfield, on the so-called Mansfield Amendment to withdraw troops from Europe. I had to stand ground against it. We won on that one.

I found myself also in strong opposition to the Carter administration throughout their period in office on unilateral troop withdrawals, taking all ground forces out of South Korea, which would have fulfilled a campaign pledge of President Carter which I felt would have been an utter disaster. Certain members of the administration telephoned after the assassination of President Park to say that if our ground forces had been taken out, there is little doubt in any of their minds that Kim Il Sung would have swung right

through into Seoul and through South Korea at that particular moment in their history.

So I think the symbolism of American forces and the feeling that we give of assurance to our allies that we are not looking to a nuclear war, we are not looking in that direction, we are essentially placing United States forces in the location where they can be most effective, together with our allied forces, that will ensure that they are the main deterrent to any aggressive action against our European friends and allies which would endanger our own national security.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I commend you for this hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee concerned with American force posture in Europe. Why? Because the commitment of American troops to Europe in defense is not now, nor has it ever been, just a question of military force level.

The American military presence in Europe represents, to my mind, a profound and continuing political decision and any change in that presence, we recognize, could have far-reaching implications on American foreign policy. As we will undoubtedly hear from Mr. Eagleburger today, these implications relate not only to the East-West conventional balance but also to the prospects for successful implementation of NATO's two-track decision of about 3 years ago now, which involves the willingness of our allies to accept new theater nuclear deployments—the Pershing, et cetera—in the absence of successful negotiations to limit or eliminate intermediate-range missiles from Europe.

Too abrupt or unilateral U.S. reductions could conceivably have the perverse effect of diminishing both Soviet willingness to negotiate and our allies' willingness to accept new deployments. Such reductions, improperly conducted, could also have negative effects on the Alliance's strength and solidarity.

In declaring my recognition of the delicacy of the American troops in Europe question, I must also state my concern that the very delicacy of this issue seems inclined to lock us in to an undue attachment to the status quo, such that no time seems right for a reexamination of the basic needs we seek to meet.

Over the years since NATO's inception, American forces deployed in Western Europe have served two primary purposes. Foremost, they have served to demonstrate to allied and adversary alike the full American commitment to the defense of the European democracy. They are more than a trip wire. Second, the American forces have served to supplement on the front line of NATO defense, the force strength of our own European allies.

In my judgment, I think that to the large majority of Americans the first purpose of American forces in Europe is a clear demonstration of our commitment. It remains today and will remain a valid need indefinitely. But I do believe the second need—that of supplementing European conventional force levels—is subject to review in light of changing circumstances. My own conclusion—and I will elaborate on this a little bit more in the question period—is that a diminished level of American forces in Europe could serve both purposes adequately.

What they are doing now is basically to provide the glue and the will to the Europeans which they are not fulfilling themselves to the degree I would like. How to achieve any such reduction is, of course, a question as to whether such a reduction is militarily or politically justified, and I am glad we will have Mr. Eagleburger with us in this regard.

Also, in connection with the votes of the North Atlantic Assembly, while, as the Chairman pointed out, there was no negative vote cast on the question of withdrawal of troops in Europe, there was at least one abstention—mine. And there may have been others; I do not know. I would also request permission of the Chairman to insert in the record a statement I made at the North Atlantic Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be incorporated at this point.

[Senator Pell's statement at the North Atlantic Assembly follows:]

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL

GENERAL DEBATE CONSENSUS, PUBLIC SUPPORT AND THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 19, 1982

The growth of Soviet military power in the 1970's has forced NATO to confront, once again, the critical question of the military balance between East and West. A key element of that balance is the conventional force balance in Europe. In my view, a realistic view of the conventional force balance in Europe is essential to ensure continuing public support for NATO.

The prevailing opinion in the West, among strategists and politicians alike, is that NATO is inferior to the Warsaw Pact in conventional strength. This view is derived principally from the aggregate statistics which show that the forces of the Warsaw Pact considerably outnumber NATO conventional forces stationed in Europe.

In my view, these statistics exaggerate the Pact's conventional strength and ignore factors that are crucial to a truly accurate assessment of NATO security. When political and technological considerations are taken into account, the conventional balance no longer appears to tilt decisively in favor of the East.

To begin with, the customary analytical practice of regarding Soviet and Eastern European troops as a combined Warsaw Pact force simply defies political reality. It is doubtful that Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Bulgarian, and East German forces would join or perform effectively with Soviet troops in an attack on Western Europe. That can only create a powerful inhibition against any Soviet thought of launching a conventional attack on the West. Accordingly, it appears reasonable for NATO to discount the offensive potential of Eastern European forces and to assess the Warsaw Pact's conventional threat largely in terms of Soviet strength.

Warsaw Pact military manpower on active duty totals some 4.8 million men, of which 1.1 million are East European forces and 3.7 million are Soviet. If one assumes that one-third of the Soviet military must remain permanently positioned on the Soviet border with China, the active-duty Soviet forces available for the European theatre can number no more than 2.5 million. About half of these are stationed in Eastern Europe. In contrast, NATO's combined active-duty forces total some 5.4 million, of which 3.4 million are in Western Europe. This means that NATO has on duty in the European theatre nearly 1 million men more than the available Soviet force and about the same number as Soviet and Eastern European forces combined. Moreover, with the exception of some 300,000 Americans, NATO forces in Europe consist almost entirely of men stationed on and prepared to fight for their own homelands. In addition, Europe's neutral nations have about a half million men on active duty who are prepared to defend their homelands. Even if reserve forces are included, this calculation does not shift in Soviet favor because the total NATO reserve—numbering nearly six million—well exceeds the Soviet reserve.

The aggregates clearly indicate that the conventional force balance in Europe is far more favorable to the Atlantic Alliance than generally acknowledged, particularly since NATO's posture is defensive. Soviet forces available to the European the-

atre do not meet the traditional rule of thumb that a three-to-one advantage in offensive forces is needed to assure success.

Of course, manpower alone does not determine relative war-fighting capabilities. Force configuration and weapons quality must also be considered. In these areas as well, NATO possesses the basic resources to blunt a conventional Soviet attack by conventional means. With respect to weapons quality, recent fighting in the Middle East demonstrates that Western-made military hardware is more than a match for Soviet hardware. In addition, the Warsaw Pact's much touted advantage in main battle tanks can be countered by NATO's potent anti-tank weaponry. Other technological advances also can enhance NATO's ability to defend Alliance territory.

This realistic assessment of the conventional force balance in Europe leads to two conclusions. First, NATO conventional forces are adequate for purposes of Western defense and need not exist simply to serve as a tripwire for nuclear escalation under NATO's flexible response strategy. In this regard, I believe that it would be feasible and desirable for NATO to re-examine its opposition to a declaration on no first use of nuclear weapons. In view of the growing strength of the peace movement on both sides of the Atlantic, public support for NATO could be undermined if NATO is not seen as doing everything possible to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

Second, Western Europeans today possess sufficient military resources—American forces aside—to mount a successful conventional defense of their own territory. In drawing this second conclusion, I would like to emphasize that I am not arguing that the U.S. troop presence in Europe is no longer necessary.

The primary purpose of American forces in Europe is to demonstrate the American commitment to Western European defense. On the military level, the commitment embodied in U.S. forces on the front-line serves to make credible the American nuclear guarantee. On the political level, it provides cement to Alliance solidarity. I believe, however, that that commitment could be demonstrated with a considerably reduced presence of American forces in Europe.

The transfer of American units from Europe to the continental United States could have significant positive impacts on the NATO alliance. Such reductions could stimulate Western European defense spending, thereby enabling NATO to achieve its 3 percent solution and possibly even the 4 percent that General Bernard Rogers has been advocating of late. Reductions could also decrease the inevitable friction between American troops and host country citizens, improve the overall rationality of U.S. global force deployments and, not least, temper the sense of transatlantic security dependence which today seems more corrosive than constructive in relations among the Western democracies. To diminish the American presence within the framework of a broad review and reaffirmation of collective commitment could install new will in the Alliance itself. In fact, a limited replacement of American forces by European forces would be well received by the American people and would strengthen public support for NATO.

Having gone to war in Europe twice in this century, the United States has demonstrated its vital interest in Europe's security. This American interest will continue as far into the future as anyone can imagine. Today, however, the Western European members of NATO are more populous, more prosperous, and—in non-nuclear terms—no less well-armed than the potential adversary they face. As a consequence, we can, without damage to the military balance on which European security depends, contemplate a carefully phased reduction of American forces in the knowledge that Western Europe has regained the economic and military strength to sustain increased responsibility for NATO's non-nuclear defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be included in the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be included at this point.

[Senator Glenn's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN

I would like to say that I understand the sense of frustration that underlies my colleague's proposal for a unilateral U.S. troop reduction in Europe. It is not, on the face of it, an unreasonable notion to assert that 37 years after World War II the NATO European allies should be capable of doing more in their own defense.

I am not adverse to the idea of change in allied burden-sharing, by which over time the United States might be enabled to shift defense resources to other areas of mutual concern, such as the Persian Gulf.

At the same time, I do not accept the argument that European contributions to the alliance effort have on balance been inconsequential to focus on a marginal decline in NATO European troop strength over the last 2 years risks serious misunderstanding.

Minor year-to-year variations in the relative United States-European contributions to the common effort are inevitable. Long term trends can be very different. During the 1970's, when the U.S. defense effort was steadily declining as a percentage of GNP, the major European allies held relatively steady. As a result, the combined United Kingdom/French/German defense budgets, which in 1970 totalled about one-quarter of the United States, had by 1980 risen to about 40 percent of ours.

During the same period, while U.S. reserve troop strengths were falling from 3 million to about 1.6 million, non-U.S./NATO reserves were increasing from 4 to 6 million.

No doubt the Europeans could do more. I have great difficulty with the notion that a unilateral U.S. withdrawal at this time is the best way to induce them to do so. Far too often, in recent years, U.S. leadership of the alliance has been expressed in sudden, uncoordinated changes of policy, announced with minimal allied consultation. The alliance is not invulnerable to divisive influences, and I would hate to see us add another.

A unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal at this time might prove particularly contentious, since we are urging the Europeans to accept deployment of a new generation of intermediate range nuclear forces. Any decline in conventional troop strength can be seen as lowering the nuclear threshold. To reduce troops while proceeding with a nuclear moderization will strengthen the arguments of those who, mistakenly, accuse the United States of planning to fight a limited nuclear war on our European allies' territories.

In short, the proposal to mandate the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from Europe at this time is the wrong way and the wrong time. If U.S. defense efforts are to shift marginally over the longer term, a possibility which I do not reject, it should be as part of an agreed alliance plan and after obtaining allied agreement. So small a withdrawal risks serious political embarrassment without even saving any considerable sum. If, on the other hand, the current proposal is merely a first installment on a larger eventual withdrawal, then that is too serious a matter to handle via a budget amendment, with scarcely any national debate.

I take note of your expressed opposition to even a freeze of U.S. forces at current levels in Europe. While I can understand your objections, I would not regard a temporary freeze, at the newly reinforced levels, as any real danger to NATO's strength or the alliance's political cohesion—particularly if accompanied by renewed efforts at the MBFR talks and extensive consultations with the allies.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eagleburger.

STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE W. BADER, DEPUTY PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, EUROPE-NATO, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Thank you. I have with me Mr. Bader from the Department of Defense, who will be prepared to answer questions along with me this morning.

I welcome the opportunity to testify today on the American role in NATO. Too often in foreign policy, as elsewhere, we take the most important things for granted. Too rarely do we examine the foundations of our security and our role in the world.

This is an important time for the United States to examine and state clearly our policies toward European security. We are now almost 2 years into the Reagan administration.

In the Soviet Union, a new leadership has just taken up the reins of power. While it is unlikely that Mr. Adropov and his associates will veer far from existing Soviet policies, they are undoubtedly

now studying the opportunities and constraints they face. They are sizing up our resolve and our steadiness, and, in particular, our ability to maintain a unified Western Alliance.

In Europe, we and our allies are succeeding in putting behind us contentious questions regarding the Siberian gas pipeline and are about to start an effort to shape a coordinated Western approach to East-West economic relations for the rest of this decade and perhaps beyond.

Against this backdrop we are now hearing voices in this country calling for a scaling down of the American role in NATO. Most disturbingly, we are facing specific proposals in the Senate and the House which would, among other things, reduce the level of U.S. forces in Europe and interfere with our ability to meet our commitment to n.odernize NATO's nuclear forces.

When such views surfaced in the past, the national commitment to a strong Atlantic Alliance prevailed. Having fought two wars to defeat aggression in Europe, the American people know that our interests cannot be insulated from events across the Atlantic. We decided after the second of those wars—as we should decide again now—that alliance with the other Western democracies is vital to our national security and prosperity. If we have learned anything from the history of this century, it is that we cannot retreat to a fortress America, nor safely disengage from European affairs.

Europe has become more, not less, important for us over the three decades since the Alliance was formed. The European and North American economies are now so tightly knit together that neither can grow without the other. The allied countries are our main export market. American direct investment in Europe is an important positive factor in our balance of payments and contributes heavily to the profitability of American business.

The United States and Western Europe are more than simply trading and political partners, however. Our security is unalterably linked with theirs. Western Europe is quite literally our first line of defense. It is the center of our global competition with the Soviet Union and by far the most alluring object of Soviet ambitions.

NATO's strength and cohesion have protected Western freedom and democracy and kept Europe peaceful for over three decades, despite a menacing Soviet military presence. If we sometimes forget that our European allies stand face to face with Soviet tanks and with Eastern totalitarianism, if the Soviet challenge sometimes seems distant to us, it is because NATO has been effective.

In recent years, Soviet military might has grown more rapidly than ever. Soviet foreign policy has become more assertive and aggressive. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is Moscow's first attempt since the end of the second world war to expand by force the area under its direct control. The assault on the people of Poland shows that the Soviet leaders will not permit free institutions in countries where it has military dominion.

The new leadership in Moscow faces basic choices about the Soviet role in the world. If they see an America drawing inward, a demoralized Western Alliance, and our European partners in doubt about the U.S. commitment, their incentive to act with greater restraint will be diminished.

The need for a strong Atlantic Alliance based on unity of purpose and steady American leadership has never been more critical.

The Reagan administration is particularly concerned, therefore, by the prospect of legislation that would cast doubt on the steadiness of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The current Senate defense appropriations bill, which contains provisions to cut back American participation in NATO defense programs, would, if passed, signal a broad U.S. retreat from its responsibilities and its leadership.

Passage of this legislation would be a fundamental departure from the historical bipartisan post-war U.S. approach to national security. Never has the American role in the defense of Western Europe been reduced through legislation. Never has the United States backed away from its NATO commitments. And never have the elected representatives of the American people voted not to stand by our Allies and back up our defense commitments.

Are we really ready now to take such a fateful step? Do we really want to greet the new Soviet leadership with a sharp deviation from the policies that have so successfully preserved Western security and American leadership in Europe?

The provisions that have been inserted in the Senate version of the proposed appropriations act that would be most damaging are: first, the reduction by 18,900 troops of the American force planned for the end of fiscal year 1983; second, the elimination of funds to procure heavy equipment for prestocking at two sites provided by Belgium and the Netherlands; third, the elimination of the American portion of the funding for 93,000 German reservists who will support our units in wartime under the Host Nation Support program, fourth, cuts in funding for the ground-launched cruise missile, which would force us to stretch our deployment schedules; and fifth, restrictions on transatlantic defense cooperation and trade.

Let me emphasize one point right away. This administration, like the Congress, is seriously concerned about the budget. We recognize that a sound economy is the necessary foundation for a successful foreign policy. But the provisions I have just outlined have almost nothing to do with budgetary austerity. The total saving contemplated by these anti-NATO proposals before the Senate is about $150 million, which is less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the total defense budget.

If the political consequences of these measures were as insignificant as the budgetary savings, I would not be here today. But the impact of these measures on our security would be out of all proportion to their budgetary significance.

I am aware that this legislation reflects a concern about the fairness of the distribution of defense burdens within the Alliance. Like you, we want the allies to do more for the common defense. And it is true that U.S. defense spending is now growing faster than that of the allies. But let me remind you that we in the United States neglected military programs for nearly a generation and that only today are we repairing the resulting gaps in our forces. We must sprint now because we went so slowly for so many years.

In contrast, the allies have kept up a strikingly steady performance. During the 1970's, their defense spending rose at a rate of 2 percent per year in real terms. Our defense spending declined in

real terms by 1 percent per year during the same period. If we had matched the allied growth rate during the 1970's, we would not need to accelerate now. Conversely, had the allies failed to maintain their steady effort in those years—had their defense spending decisions been dominated by considerations of what some here in the United States now call "equity" rather than need—the Alliance would not be as secure as it is today.

In any case, it would be a tragic mistake to allow concerns about burden-sharing to prevent us from doing what is necessary for our own security. Following that policy would allow those whose defense performance is weakest to set the standard. We are fortunate that the allies did not adopt such an attitude during a time of less-than-adequate U.S. performance.

After all the arguments and counterarguments about burden-sharing have been heard, we must, at the end of the day, ask ourselves one basic question. Will the United States be more or less secure if these provisions are enacted? I believe the answer is clearly "less secure." Let me outline the effects I foresee.

First, the American commitment to NATO would be placed in doubt. I do not see how the advocates of this legislation could dispute this or argue that causing doubts about our commitment would advance our interests. Nothing could weaken the Alliance more than the perception in Europe that the United States is not determined to preserve European security.

Our allies would take little comfort in the fact that the amount of money involved is small. They would see passage of these cuts as a statement of U.S. intentions; they would interpret it as the beginning of a more general American retreat from Europe.

The Soviets would undoubtedly try to exploit the inevitable doubts and fears of the Europeans. Dividing us from our allies and pushing us out of Europe are, of course, central goals of Soviet foreign policy. The administration has, as you know, recently made progress in healing divisions and rebuilding consensus and confidence in the Alliance. This legislation could undo what has been achieved.

Second, reductions, especially reductions in the number of American troops in Europe, would send the worst possible signal to European publics about the importance of a strong defense. NATO and U.S. leaders have been warning Europeans that the Soviet threat is growing. Reducing American forces or abandoning planned improvements would make these warnings sound hollow and undermine European public and Parliamentary support for defense expenditures.

Proponents of this legislation may claim that our doing less would jolt our Allies into doing more. I see no basis for such wishful thinking. U.S. cuts would have the opposite effect. If we do less, the Europeans will do less, and we will all be less secure.

Third, these cuts, while small in dollar amounts, would hit priority, cost-effective programs especially hard. The proposed troop cuts could leave our combat forces undermanned, or force the withdrawal of other essential units. Reductions in funding for prepositioning combat equipment and our share of the host nation support agreement would compound the difficulties and costs of wartime deployment.

We are constantly striving to make our dollars buy more fighting strength. These programs enhance our combat capacity by improving what is sometimes called our "teeth-to-tail" ratio. The proposed cuts would therefore reverse a major effort to improve our forces' effectiveness, while saving very little money. Moreover, they would not simply penalize our allies but our own forces as well, by denying them the means to carry out their rapid reinforcement mission.

Fourth, these cuts would damage the very programs in which allied performance has been especially good. The Europeans have joined the host nation support and prepositioning programs with the clear and correct understanding that we would match or supplement them. If we now back down on our side of the bargain, we will not only lose the benefits of these programs but will undermine our credibility for the development of any future cooperative efforts.

In 1978, at a summit meeting in Washington, Alliance leaders agreed to a long-term program providing, among other things, for rapid U.S. wartime reinforcement of Europe. Since then, our allies have fulfilled their commitment. For example, Belgium and the Netherlands, both small and densely populated countries, have gone to considerable effort and expense to obtain the land required to store prepositioned U.S. equipment.

The Federal Republic of Germany has allocated half the funds for 93,000 additional German reservists to support U.S. deployments. The proposed appropriations bill would threaten both of these programs. Is this a sensible way to respond when the allies have done just what we proposed that they do?

If restrictions on our contributions to the long-term defense program stand, the entire program will atrophy. We will turn a notable success into failure. We will cancel out much of what we and the allies have already achieved and paid for.

Last June in Bonn, President Reagan and his allied counterparts committed themselves in a special summit charter to specific plans for improving NATO's conventional capabilities. This charter called for the achievement of demanding force goals, and identified priority programs. I cannot now guarantee that this charter will be implemented in every detail, though we will work very hard to that end. But I can say with absolute confidence that if these cuts are legislated, that charter will not be translated into concrete improvements.

Let me restate unequivocally our ageement that the allies need to do more. This administration has made that clear at every opportunity, here and abroad, and is working to produce a greater allied contribution to our common defense effort.

Our attempts to foster better cooperation, better coordination of United States and European defense spending, and to have our allies take greater responsibility for our common defense are bearing fruit, but only if we ourselves keep the commitments that we have made can we count on the allies to improve their performance.

Finally, a legislated, unilateral U.S. pullback from our military commitments to NATO would damage prospects for arms control. Unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals would remove any incentive for

the Soviets to agree to mutual reductions that would lower the threat and ease the military confrontation in the heart of Europe.

At the MBFR talks in Vienna we are seeking to negotiate the new Western draft treaty put forward by the President last spring. That treaty would correct the present imbalance between Soviet and Western forces in Central Europe through significant verifiable reductions to equal levels.

A cut in funding for the ground-launched cruise missile and the deletion of funds for the deployment of the Pershing II missile, which has been voted in the House, would dash our hopes for a negotiated solution to the problem posed by the Soviet SS–20 intermediate range nuclear missiles. In the INF talks in Geneva, we have proposed a treaty that would ban this whole class of Soviet and U.S. intermediate range nuclear missiles, but only if we and our allies show that we are resolved to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe can we get to the Soviets to negotiate seriously.

The advocates of this legislation owe it to us all to explain how it would help arms control and thus contribute to reduction of the threat. Is there any evidence that unilateral limits and cuts can have anything other than a destructive effect on negotiated arms control? Should we not be more concerned about reducing the threat than about reducing our ability to counter it?

Let me conclude with a few basic points. The Atlantic Alliance has provided well for Western security for 30 years. That alliance is built upon the forces that we and our allies have deployed in Europe and the conviction that the United States is fully committed to the defense of Europe. When those forces and that conviction are strong, deterrence in Europe is sturdy and we are secure. We weaken them at our peril.

The world will be dangerous enough in this decade. It is not in our interest to tamper with North Atlantic security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Secretary. We will go on a 10-minute rule this morning.

Just to be sure we know exactly what the Appropriations Committee proposal would do, we had actually in Europe in troop strength on September 30th, 1982, 355,600 troops. To bring down the level to 331,700, as they propose, the level of September 30th, 1980, would mean a reduction of 24,000 troops.

We have certainly both agreed that there would be a disastrous reaction in Europe. I have seen that in the talks that I have had with members of 16 countries now. Is there anything that has happened in Europe that would justify a 24,000 man reduction? Is there any lessening of the military threat that we have from the Soviet Union to Western Europe?

You mentioned the recent change of command. Is there any reason we have to believe that the threat is any less that would justify any withdrawal?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Chairman, I don't myself see any reason to believe that the threat has lessened. And indeed, I would argue that in the political area, there are factors which argue that we need now to be particularly careful. One is that there has been a change in the leadership in the Soviet Union, and I think we

have to be very careful about the sorts of signals we send at this time of transition.

Second, as I indicated, we are in the midst of negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces in Geneva, and it seems to me that we need to be terribly cautious about the signals we send now to the Soviets in terms of how they may act or react in those negotiations. We should not be reducing our ability to negotiate in Geneva, and I think all of these steps would in fact do that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Appropriations Committee has specifically directed that the Fourth Mechanized Brigade of the Fourth Infantry Division be disbanded. It is my understanding that this brigade is under the command of the U.S. Fifth Corps, which holds the sector on the central front known as the Fulda Gap. Most defense experts believe that the Fulda Gap would form the principal axis of the Soviet thrust into Western Europe should war occur.

Is the administration opposed to disbanding the Fourth Brigade?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me ask Mr. Bader to refer to that.

Mr. BADER. Mr. Chairman, the question of the deactivation of that brigade is currently under review. Back in 1981, a judgment had been made as part of an overall restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe to deactivate that unit. With the events of December 1981, and the problems in and around Poland, it was decided to maintain that force in its current disposition as part of this overall restructuring.

We have not yet made a decision on what we would do with that brigade, but the original idea was not predicated on the notion of eliminating forces, but by compensating for the withdrawal of that organization both through unit sizing of existing organizations to compensate for it and to supplement it with a different type of organization.

That is still the decision that is currently before us.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further you can add or expand on the concept that the administration was considering last year to deactivate this unit, and why it has changed its mind?

Mr. BADER. Well, it changed its mind because of the events in and around Poland in December of 1981. We thought deactivating that brigade would send entirely the wrong signal during the period of tension. The plan before then was because of what we call Division 86, which is a different unit structure for our division forces.

The withdrawal of that organization would be compensated for by changes in and additions to the remaining divisions. Another proposal that we are considering is to make that unit the forward brigade for a division that would reinforce Europe.

And so those are the various alternatives that we have before us now, but it certainly was not in any way viewed or motivated by an idea of reducing that capability in that vital area. It was just a different approach to mixing the capability of that area with different types of fire power, different types of units.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Appropriations Committee should prevail on this issue, in your judgment, is it likely that any European country would step up and provide a new unit to take the Fourth Brigade's place?

Mr. BADER. No, sir. That is our sector, and I don't think that that would be—I don't think that would happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell the committee why troop levels have crept up in recent years? Which programs actually have accounted for the growth?

Mr. BADER. The figures that you use, Mr. Chairman, are essentially correct, but also help, I think, define the dilemma and the problem of using a snapshot picture of what our troop strength is at any given time. For example, in the figures that you used, there was a temporary deployment of our annual Reforger exercise that had a complement of about 10,400 Marines and soldiers. So that is in itself a very artificial and temporary increase.

There are also increases principally in the Air Force and the Navy. On the Navy, at any given time we can have carriers exchanging in the Med, and once they cross that line they are added to the forces deployed to Europe.

Again, this is a temporary phenomenon. There have been some increases in Navy support personnel when this administration decided that the past neglect of our maintenance capability in Europe was debasing our military capability. This was also true with the Air Force in that the maintenance capability particularly associated with the new aircraft that we were putting in Europe require a different type of support.

Also, in the figures you used, which are also projected, we would have Air Force personnel associated with the ground-launched cruise missile. Also in the figures you used, part of the increase in the Air Force is explained by our AWACS deployment and the airmen that are associated with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Eagleburger, under the Appropriations Committee proposal, the United States would unilaterally withdraw more troops than it would be required to do under the MBFR proposal which NATO proposed in July, but instead of securing the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet troops, in return we would get none.

Are you optimistic that an MBFR agreement might be reached in the near term?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You mean in the context of these troop withdrawals, or just in general? Well, let me do it both ways. I think certainly the troop withdrawals would make it impossible to arrive at an agreement on MBFR now. As for the MBFR negotiations themselves, I must tell you in all honesty, I do not think that we can arrive at a negotiated settlement with the Soviets in the near term.

I think it is fairly clear in examining the history of those negotiations over the last few years that it is a negotiation that is particularly difficult. We are hung up at this moment on the question of, for example, data. I think it is going to take a long time to resolve those questions, but I am not at all pessimistic that over the longer term, and I think it will take some time, it may well be possible to arrive at an agreement with the Soviets which would reduce troop levels on both sides. But I do not think that is going to be possible at all if we unilaterally withdraw troops from Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, Senator Nunn, who was with us on the trip to the North Atlantic Assembly, has discussed a freeze at cur-

rent levels. Has the administration taken a position on this proposal?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. With regard to the Nunn freeze proposal at this point, Senator, the best I can say is that in our view, while it might not have as bad an effect, it nevertheless has sufficient bad effects that we are again, I think, opposed to that proposal.

One of the examples, just one of the examples is in terms of what Mr. Bader was saying before about the question of forces in and out of the Med, for example. You get into a very difficult situation where you have a freeze imposed upon you by the Congress. This raises concerns as far as I am concerned in terms of the European attitude toward it.

But in addition to that, it makes it terribly difficult then to manage the replacement of forces and moving those forces around.

Let me come back to the one point. What worries me most about this and the Nunn proposal and these other proposals is that, as I emphasize in my statement, this would be the first time that the Congress would be legislating either a reduction or indeed a freeze on forces in Europe, and I think we need to think very hard about the impact that would have on our European allies.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to question the common assumption that NATO is inferior to the Warsaw Pact when it comes to conventional forces. I have been coming to the conclusion that this is perhaps incorrect, if we look at the overall picture.

First, let's talk about the gross numbers, and I think if you disagree with me as we go along here, please let me know, but my understanding is that the Warsaw Pact has active duty manpower of 4.8 million, of which a little less than a quarter, 1.1 million, were Eastern European forces, and 3.7 million are Soviet forces.

Now, if you assume that one-third of the Soviet military is pretty well tied down on the Soviet border with China, and also in there Vietnam, Afghanistan, then active duty Soviet forces available for the Soviet theater number no more than 2.5 million.

In contrast, I believe it is correct to say that NATO's combined active duty forces total 5.4 million, of which 3.4 million are in Western Europe. In my mind, this means that NATO has in duty in the European theater nearly 1 million men more than the available Soviet forces, and about the same number as Soviet and East European forces combined.

Now, with this sort of numerical preface in mind, let's add a couple of non-numerical political factors. With the exception, first, of the 300,000 Americans, NATO forces in Europe consist almost entirely of men stationed on and prepared to fight for their own homelands.

Second, we are not including in these figures the effective force of neutrals, Sweden and Switzerland.

Third, it is extremely doubtful that the Warsaw Pact allies, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, or East Germans, would join in and perform effectively with the Soviet troops in an attack on Western Europe.

And fourth, I have always understood that a traditional rule of thumb is that an attacker must have a 3-to-1 or at least a 2 to 1 edge in order to assure success.

And fifth, qualitatively, NATO weaponry is by just about every account superior to Warsaw Pact weaponry. We saw this in the recent events in Lebanon, and my understanding is that while the Soviets have far more tanks than we have, many more tanks, that we have far more effective antitank weapons, and one $30,000 antitank weapon can destroy a $3 million tank, so you can't judge it just on the number of tanks.

So, my question to you, and I would be very grateful if you would enlarge on this, is, how do these facts, if they are facts, if you would agree on that in the first place, how they square with the common assumption of NATO's conventional inferiority?

In the first place, are any of my facts wrong, any of my statements wrong?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Not on the basis of my quick listening, but Mr. Bader, do you want to debate the figures at all? Then I will come back to the question.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. BADER. Senator, I think that one of the inconsistencies in the figures you presented is that you allow for NATO reserve units in your total, but not for Soviet reserves, so that the figures—and you include all of U.S. forces, no matter where they may be, which is not the same thing as if the Soviets have a problem of the units that are outside the immediate combat area. We have much more of a problem of reinforcing Europe.

I think the committee itself, Senator, in the report that you issued in April, joined in agreement that indeed the conventional threat was awesome, and that all the indices of any qualitative and quantitative measurement of the relative capability of NATO forces and Warsaw Pact forces clearly show that the superiority was on the side of the Pact.

The committee properly noted, since NATO is a defensive alliance, that that accounts for some qualitative measurement. And since the deterrent strategy that NATO has adopted is that we have to have enough force available so that the planners in the Soviet Union could assume that there would be considerable risk in attaining their goals, and that we believe we still have.

But as far as the relative capability of either side, I think the weight of evidence would suggest clearly that it belongs to the Warsaw Pact.

Senator PELL. If I understand what you are saying, it is that the Soviets have a greater strength in reserve. You are right. My figures are active duty forces, which is what we generally consider. Except for that addition that you have mentioned, is there anything else wrong in my facts?

Mr. BADER. With all due deference, Senator, I would have to sit down and analyze your figures, but I think that in the context of the presentation I have just made, I and the administration and the committee come to different conclusions.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, let me, if I may, try to add to what Mr. Bader has said.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. If I could interrupt there, I recognize we come to different conclusions, but it is important that we come to them with the same factual base, somewhat like the MBFR, and the only thing that is holding it down, as far as I understand it, is, as the Secretary pointed out, the data base.

If we could resolve the data base difference, the MBFR could go off well instead of as they have for almost a dozen years now.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me stipulate, then, Senator, and I will correct it for the record if there is any major discrepancy, the figures, as you cited them to me, more or less fall in the ball park as I know them, but as I say, if in reviewing this when I get back we find there are major differences, I will let the committee know.

But it does seem to me, and I make no claim to be a military expert—you will all be relieved to hear that—but it does seem to me that there are several other factors, and Mr. Bader has touched on some of them, that need to be looked at, one of which is in fact the difference in the ability to reinforce.

The Soviets can move into Western Europe relatively quickly. The United States, on the other hand, has to bear the burden of crossing the Atlantic in whatever wartime conditions might pertain, and that is why in fact, for example, things like wartime host nation support and the POMCUS issue are important to us, because they improve the ability to reinforce quickly.

Having said that, Senator, it seems to me that to some degree, at least, the postulation that you have given implies certain assumptions. One is that forces will be tied down on the Chinese border. That may or may not prove to be the case. As for the question of whether or not Eastern European forces will fight alongside the Soviet forces, I think having spent some time in Eastern Europe, there is at least reason to believe that while we may hope that Eastern European forces might prove less than effective, we cannot count on that.

So, I think some of those assumptions have to be at least questioned in terms of trying to establish what is sufficient defense for us in NATO.

Having said that, my basic personal judgment is that while the Soviets hold a conventional advantage, it is by no means sufficient for a Soviet planner to decide that he can with impunity attack Western Europe and get away with it, and it seems to me that that is the critical fact, and that is the fact that we must keep in mind as we examine how we deal with Western Europe on the defense issue.

And that is that we must maintain sufficient forces and the reality of sufficient rapid deployment to Europe to convince Soviet defense planners that they cannot attack Western Europe and assume that they are going to win.

Senator PELL. Going to the question of reinforcements, are they correct in saying that the total reserves available to NATO are superior, more than the total reserves available to the Warsaw Pact?

Mr. BADER. Theoretically, Senator, I believe that is correct. But again, we do have the problem of reinforcement over great distances to get our forces from here to there.

Senator PELL. Let me put it another way. How would the reserves of the Europeans—and you must conclude here the coun-

tries like Sweden who are also affected—compare with the reserves of the Soviet Union and its allies, or the Soviet Union rather.

Mr. BADER. Compare in what sense, Senator?

Senator PELL. That the reserves are greater on the part of the NATO allies if you do not count the United States, than they are, the Soviet Union by itself?

Mr. BADER. The difficulty, Senator, is always in questioning manpower. One has to go down a second level and examine the equipment and the capability of those reserve organizations to perform missions, and I think that is part of the problem. Indeed, Europeans do have sizable reserves.

One of the major programs under the long-term defense program that we proposed back in 1978 was for the Europeans to increase the capability of the reserve forces, and that program is going forward. But it still has not reached a point where you could be sanguine about the relative capability of NATO reserve forces versus the Soviets.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you that motivation is very important. I think when you are fighting to defend your homeland, you have pretty good motivation.

I would just comment that the figures I have used about the equality of the forces facing each other included the Eastern Europeans. Even if you included the Eastern Europeans in them, in the active duty forces, there is an equality of forces.

My time has expired. I would just compliment you, Mr. Secretary, on that word "sufficient." I think that is a word that we used when I was with Kosygin about 12 or 14 years ago, about the nuclear balance, that each side wanted "sufficient." We got away from that, equal and superior, and I wish you would keep that in the lexicon of all of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. May I ask those of you in the back—can I see the hands of any of those having trouble hearing this morning?

[There was a show of hands.]

The CHAIRMAN. I see a lot of people straining, not only in the back there, all over. I am going to ask both of our witnesses to speak up as if you are talking to the entire room because the purpose of these people being here is to hear you. And they cannot really do it.

Without objection, I will insert in the record at this point the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons study released by NATO in May.

[The document referred to follows:]

NATO and the WARSAW PACT

FORCE COMPARISONS

12-151 O—82——4

FOREWORD

It is the essential purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to search for a more stable relationship between East and West in which the fundamental political issues dividing them can be resolved peacefully. As matters stand, we continue to be compelled to safeguard peace through our ability to deter aggression and to protect ourselves from political blackmail. But we also continue to seek ways of improving this situation. Deterrence and defence, together with arms control and disarmament, are integral parts of Alliance security policy. The Allies remain committed to vigorous efforts in all appropriate fora to achieve substantial, balanced and verifiable arms limitations and reductions. The object of this policy is a stable military balance, if possile at reduced levels of forces.

The numerical balance of forces has moved slowly but steadily in favour of the Warsaw Pact over the past two decades. During this period the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have lost much of the technological advantage which permitted NATO to rely on the view that quality could compensate for quantity. It is clear that the trend is dangerous. Nevertheless the overall deterrent continues to safeguard peace.

Security is fundamental to well-being. The publics of each member nation of NATO therefore have the right to know what efforts are being undertaken to ensure their future security and what constitutes the challenges. This is why this publication comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces has been prepared. It carries the conviction and authority of all the NATO nations which participate in the integrated military structure of the Alliance; as such its presentation is factual, objective and unbiased. I commend it not only within NATO but to the much wider publics outside the Alliance for whom the maintenance of peace and security in the West is of fundamental importance.

Joseph M.A.H. LUNS
Secretary General of NATO

INTRODUCTION

General

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a defensive alliance of sovereign and independent nations. It is dedicated to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of individual liberty and the rule of law. The Alliance aims to prevent war; indeed the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a lasting peaceful order accompanied by appropriate security guarantees. It works to achieve this by improving understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to ensure that an attack on any member of the Alliance will not take place. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.

2. Since it was established in 1949, NATO has supported many efforts to achieve real improvements in international relations. While doing what is necessary for their defence, NATO nations try to bring about progress in East-West detente. For instance, they continue to make a constructive contribution to detente by their active participation in the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, aimed at enhancing stability, reducing confrontation and strengthening co-operation. They participate in or are associated with a number of arms control negotiations, including the East-West force reductions talks in Vienna (MBFR) and the negotiations between the Unit ' States and the Soviet Union on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Geneva, with the aim of achieving more stable and balanced East-West relations at lower force levels. The United States is also actively preparing for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and is committed to negotiate an equitable and verifiable agreement on strategic nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union resulting in substantial reductions. Negotiations for phased arms limitations and reductions need to take account of the military efforts of the other side so that the Alliance's defensive capabilities remain guaranteed at each stage of the negotiating process. Unilateral nuclear disarmament would give the Soviet Union, which could not be relied upon to follow suit, an overwhelming military advantage. Therefore, these efforts need the backing of a firm defence policy and sufficient military forces to implement it. NATO must be able to make clear to any potential aggressor that it has both the political will and the military capabilities to defend its members. Such a policy is the greatest safeguard that no one will attack a member of the Alliance or use the threat of military force as a means of coercion. This posture is known as deterrence.

3. The size and type of forces which could be used against NATO are factors which influence the kinds of forces the Alliance needs to deter a military threat and thereby to prevent aggression in any form. NATO as a defensive alliance does not seek superiority nor does it attempt to match the Warsaw Pact man for man or system for system. However, to ensure preservation of stability and peace, the relationship between the overall military capabilities both nuclear and conventional of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must not become unbalanced to the extent that the credibility of NATO's deterrent could be called into question. In other words, the Alliance requires enough forces of the right kinds to make clear that it would be able to respond to any type of aggression in an effective way. The Triad which provides this NATO deterrent comprises the strategic nuclear forces,

its intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces(1), and its conventional forces. Any gap in the field of intermediate and short-range nuclear forces could give rise to the risk that the Soviet Union might believe - however incorrectly - that it could make or threaten limited strikes against NATO Europe from a sanctuary in the Soviet Union. Intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces in NATO Europe provide a crucial link between the conventional defence of NATO Europe and the United States strategic nuclear forces, the ultimate guarantee of NATO's security. These capabilities would enable the Alliance to choose amongst a number of options and to ensure that an aggressor is left in no doubt as to NATO's readiness and will to defend itself while leaving it uncertain as to the form that defence would take. This is the essence of NATO's overall strategy known as "flexible response". For deterrence to be effective the Alliance must be able both to make credible its capability and willingness to defend itself and to make the risks unacceptable for any potential aggressor.

4. The Warsaw Pact leadership has repeatedly stated that the Warsaw Pact is strictly defensive and its strategy is designed to prevent war. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership continues to work for the spread of Communism worldwide and sees the disappearance of competing political systems as an historically inevitable process. Further, its declared military doctrine equates defence with offensive operations and Warsaw Pact military strength is on a scale well in excess of reasonably justifiable requirements for defence.

(1) This terminology is consistent with that used in the arms control negotiations currently taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union; these forces were previously covered under the term theatre nuclear forces.

5. Moreover, Warsaw Pact military doctrine as shown by its literature and military exercises calls for large-scale penetration into enemy territory in order to secure strategic objectives; it continues to emphasize the element of surprise and the necessity of rapid offensive operations. Warsaw Pact forces are therefore organized and equipped in accordance with the fundamental principle that they must be able to take the offensive in a conflict. This means the use of combined arms operations in which all forces, conventional and nuclear, are brought to bear in a unified manner, using all necessary assets. Soviet military capabilities would enable the use of chemical weapons on a large scale.

Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces

6. Many factors contribute to the capability to deter or defend against aggression, including political and social stability, geography, economic strength, human resources, industrial and technological resources, as well as military capabilities. The military forces possessed by each side are clearly important elements in this equation. But in comparing each side's military forces it is important to avoid over-simplifying the picture. A complete assessment of the global balance of power would have to take into account forces other than those that are available to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Even a full assessment restricted to NATO and the Warsaw Pact capabilities would have to take into account not just the conventional forces deployed by each side in Europe but also certain worldwide deployments by a number of NATO countries as well as by the Soviet Union. For instance, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintain substantial forces in Asia and the Pacific.

7. In addition to simple force differences there are also other elements important to an understan-

ding of the balance. They are, for example, differences in military strategy and structure, political organization and cohesion, naval capabilities and rôles, nuclear capabilities and the impact of timely reinforcements. Other important considerations are the amount of ammunition, fuel and other stocks possesed by each side, the quality of their equipment, their organization, their personnel, their leadership and morale, as well as each side's economic, industrial and technological ability to sustain a military conflict. This publication cannot attempt to cover all these issues. Instead, it supplies up-to-date information on the more important aspects of the military postures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, thus providing the reader with a basis for forming his own judgements. In this connection, it must be realised that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact deploy a number of weapon systems capable of being used both in a conventional and a nuclear rôle; in general such systems are considered in both the conventional and the nuclear sections of this publication. The allocation of forces shown in this publication is for comparative purposes only and does not necessarily correspond to any specific scenario or situation. This applies particularly to comparisons of conventional forces where the criterion is based on in place forces; this suggests that such forces are intended a priori for use in Europe only. This presentation obviously has no bearing on the need, in the course of negotiations which may lead to the establishment of permanent constraints concerning military activities in Europe, such as those which may take place at a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, to take account of the activities of conventional forces deployed in Europe including the entire European part of the Soviet Union. The Allies have on many occasions explained the political reasons (equal treatment of participating countries) and the military reasons (mobility of conventional forces) which justify this necessity.

8. Geographic and economic dissimilarities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact directly affect rôles and missions of their armed forces. The Warsaw Pact, for example, is one geographic entity in contrast to NATO, which is separated by oceans, seas and in some regions, particularly in the south, by the territory of nations which are not members of the Alliance. This allows the Warsaw Pact to transfer land and air forces and support between different areas via internal and generally secure lines of communications. It also contributes to enabling the Warsaw Pact to select the time and place in which to concentrate its forces. However, Soviet naval forces are divided in four widely separated fleets; this makes it difficult for them to mass naval power for joint operations.

9. NATO, on the other hand, must transfer resources along lengthy and vulnerable air and sea routes to and around Europe. The most powerful partner in NATO, the United States, is separated from its European allies by an ocean 6,000 km wide. Moreover, NATO nations, to a far greater extent than those of the Warsaw Pact, depend on shipping for vital economic purposes. Thus, unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO has a fundamental dependence on shipping during peace and war. This fact requires markedly different missions for Warsaw Pact naval forces on the one hand and NATO naval forces on the other. Additionally, NATO lacks geographical depth between the possible areas of conflict and the coasts, so rendering its rear areas, headquarters and supplies more vulnerable to enemy attack and more difficult to defend.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISSIMILARITIES
A NATO PROBLEM



FIGURE 1

10. The Warsaw Pact nations have a standing force of some 5.7 million personnel of which some 4 million face NATO in Europe. In addition, there are over 700,000 personnel with some military training enrolled in the national security forces. Warsaw Pact forces worldwide include 244 active divisions plus 27 brigades, with 60,000 main battle tanks and air forces equipped with over 12,000 aircraft. Ground and air forces in Europe are forward deployed, well structured, positioned and prepared for offensive operations. The Warsaw Pact possesses an impressive inventory of naval forces, the largest component of which is the Soviet Navy. In addition to ballistic missile submarines Soviet active naval forces include more than 300 other submarines (a number of which are equipped to launch Cruise missiles), about 40 major surface combatant ships (carriers and cruisers) and about 400 naval bombers (most of which are equipped to deliver anti-ship missiles). A large number of these forces are not in the NATO/Warsaw Pact area and indeed some, primarily those of the Soviet Union, are deployed worldwide. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has, in recent years, significantly improved the quality of equipment in all components of its armed forces; strategic, ground, air and naval.

11. The standing forces of the NATO nations total 4.4 million personnel, of which some 2.6 million are stationed in Europe. There are also about half a million other militarily trained personnel, such as Home Guards and Gendarmerie. Total armed forces belonging to NATO nations, but not all committed to NATO, include 76 active divisions plus 123 brigades (normally in NATO 3 brigades equal 1 division), with about 22,670 main battle tanks and air forces equipped with approximately 11,270 combat aircraft. NATO forces are well trained and, given the full range of capabilities at their disposal, are capable of presenting a credible defence of Alliance territory. In most NATO countries, modern and effective aircraft, tanks and anti-tank weapons are being introduced into the armed forces. The naval forces of some NATO nations include elements deployed on a worldwide basis. Of an overall total of about 190 attack submarines, 40 major combatant ships (carriers and cruisers), and more than 500 attack aircraft, not all could be made available in the NATO area. That is to say, the forces shown as available to NATO are not a simple aggregation of the forces possessed by each member country, but are based on availability and allocation(2).

12. The overall global figures given in the previous paragraphs have been mentioned to enable the statistics and comparisons which follow to be seen in their proper perspective. From now on the figures on military forces in this publication show the forces which could be expected to be available to NATO (less those of France) and those of the Warsaw Pact which it is considered would be facing them. The focus is on Europe. In particular, United States and Soviet forces in the Pacific and Soviet forces facing China have not been included.

The Problems of Mobilization and Reinforcement

13. The bulk of NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions would require some degree of completion in manpower and equipment to achieve full wartime establishments. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact rely heavily on mobilization of reservists to bring up to strength existing divisions and to mobilize new formations. Because of the closely controlled social structures in the Warsaw Pact nations and the length and intensiveness of their military conscription, the

(2) For more detailed explanation see Explanatory Notes.

maintenance of a significant pool of trained reserve manpower can be accomplished on a continuing basis by the Warsaw Pact more readily than in most NATO nations.

14. The Warsaw Pact can therefore mobilize its man power more readily than NATO. It can also reinforce more quickly because most of NATO's reinforcements of men and equipment must be moved across the Atlantic and the English Channel. The Warsaw Pact on the other hand can move many of its central reserves rapidly by road and air; some of its airborne and air-mobile forces could be moved in even less time. NATO cannot sustain an effective defence against these reinforced Warsaw Pact forces solely with in-place forces. Therefore a successful defence is largely dependent upon the timely arrival of substantial reinforcements, principally from the United States, but also from Canada and in Europe itself from the United Kingdom and Portugal. However, the problems would be considerable even if there were to be reasonable warning time. Rapid reinforcement is a very complex operation that demands the timely availability of numerous resources, particularly transport aircraft and shipping. There are a considerable number of reinforcement air squadrons available to cross the Atlantic in a few hours, but these would have to wait for the subsequent arrival of their ground crew and support equipment before becoming operational.

15. As will be seen from the later sections of this publication, standing Warsaw Pact forces are more numerous than those of NATO. This advantage for the Warsaw Pact is likely to remain and indeed could increase at least for some considerable time as both sides reinforce, with NATO having to bring most of its reinforcements, and particularly its equipment, across the Atlantic, and the Warsaw Pact benefiting from internal and shorter lines of communication.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Land Forces

16. Warsaw Pact forces facing Allied Command Europe (ACE), which is the NATO military command which stretches from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey, consist of about 164 divisions plus the equivalent of 9 divisions of airborne, air assault and air-mobile formations, which could be used in a number of different areas. Many of these 173 divisions are ready to fight at very short notice. These standing Warsaw Pact forces can be reinforced by about 15 divisions from the Strategic Reserve based in the central Military Districts of Russia (Moscow, Ural and Volga Military Districts) which could also be used in a number of different areas. Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than NATO divisions but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby producing similar combat power. The majority of Warsaw Pact land forces are positioned well forward. Their principal offensive conventional capabilities consist of tanks, modern mechanized infantry vehicles and highly mobile long range artillery and mortars; large numbers of these are to be found in all their units. A range of nuclear and chemical weapons are assigned to the larger formations, namely fronts and armies. Growing numbers of transport, support and attack helicopters provide the Warsaw Pact with a quick assault and reaction capability, as well as a significant supplement to their fixed-wing tactical aircraft in the battlefield area.

17. NATO land forces stationed in Europe number some 84 divisions (including three airborne/air mobile divisions), many of which are also ready to fight at very short notice. There are in addition 13 active United States divisions including two Marine divisions and a Canadian brigade in North America which could be made available in Europe in due course. Almost half of NATO's tank and mechanized divisions are equipped with modern weapons although there is a very unfavourable ratio between NATO anti-tank guided weapons and Warsaw Pact tanks and armoured personnel vehicles. NATO similarly has a lower proportion of armed attack helicopters. Only the United States has a retaliatory chemical capability, and a number of NATO nations lack adequate protection against chemical weapons. Figure 2 compares the in-place manpower, divisions and major equipment of both sides.

18. In Figure 2 the totals of main battle tanks, artillery and mortars take account of the current reorganization of Soviet divisions. The total inventory in combat units has thus increased by about 500 tanks and 1,500 artillery pieces. The figure of over 78,000 Warsaw Pact armoured vehicles includes about 58,000 armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, plus 20,000 additional armoured vehicles whose primary rôle is command and control, forward air control and reconnaissance but which also have a secondary rôle of direct combat. NATO forces have been counted in a similar manner. The anti-tank guided weapons mounted on Warsaw Pact vehicles for self defence have been included in the total figures as have been helicopter-mounted anti-tank guided weapons to ensure an accurate comparison with NATO forces.

19. Relative trends over the last few years in main battle tanks and artillery are shown in Figure 3.

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NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON

(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)



NOTES: 1. WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS NORMALLY CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL THAN MANY NATO DIVISIONS BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THEREBY OBTAINING SIMILAR COMBAT POWER.

2. FORCES IN PLACE IN NATO EUROPE, WARSAW PACT FORCES AS FAR EAST AS BUT EXCLUDING THE 3 WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IN WESTERN RUSSIA (MOSCOW, VOLGA & URAL MILITARY DISTRICTS).

FIGURE 2

RELATIVE TRENDS IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND ARTILLERY

IN PLACE IN EUROPE



MAIN BATTLE TANKS

(MAIN ARMAMENT 90mm AND ABOVE)

ARTILLERY/MORTARS

(TUBES 100mm AND ABOVE INCLUDING ROCKET LAUNCHERS)

FIGURE 3

Air Forces and Air Defence Forces

20. The overall global total of Warsaw Pact aircraft is more than 12,000*. More than 10,000* of these are facing NATO Europe, of which 7,500* are of types technically capable of delivering nuclear weapons; these figures include aircraft not assigned to combat units. The majority of these nuclear capable aircraft would be likely to be used in conventional attacks over Europe. The total number of combat aircraft in operational units facing NATO Europe is 7,240 (see figure 4). Warsaw Pact air and defence forces as far east as the Urals (but excluding those in the Moscow Military and Air Defence Districts) consist of some 4,370 interceptor/air-combat aircraft. Many of these aircraft can be used in offensive roles such as assuring air superiority over the battlefield and they are backed up by extensive modern surface-to-air missile systems. Additionally there are some 1,920 ground-attack fighter bombers, 600 reconnaissance aircraft and about 350 bombers (excluding Soviet Naval Aviation), the majority of which would likely be used in a conventional rôle. There are also about 50 long-range aviation Backfire bombers which have a major conventional rôle in Europe. The Backfire bomber is however dealt with in the nuclear section. These air forces could be reinforced with some 750 combat aircraft from central Russia at a faster rate than NATO's air forces could be effectively reinforced across the Atlantic. Significant numbers of new combat aircraft are introduced each year, replacing older models. The introduction of these modern tactical aircraft has considerably increased the Warsaw Pact's offensive capability, as its latest aircraft are capable of carrying up to twice the payload, can travel over three times the range, at higher speeds, and can conduct operations at lower altitudes than the aircraft they are replacing; this renders them less vulnerable to NATO air defences. Their increased combat radius would allow for Warsaw Pact operations from more distant bases in case of Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO, rendering more difficult counter-air operations by NATO, since NATO fighter-bombers would have to penetrate deeper into defended enemy airspace to counter-attack Warsaw Pact airbases. An increasing proportion of these modern aircraft can operate in adverse weather conditions by day or by night. The Warsaw Pact airlift capability is substantial. Soviet military transport aviation alone, consisting of over 600 long and medium-range aircraft, provides sufficient airlift to transport one complete airborne division and its equipment at any one time up to distances of 2,000 km. This capability can be supplemented in particular by Aeroflot civilian aircraft.

NATO/WARSAW PACT COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN EUROPE

	Fighter-Bomber Ground-Attack	Interceptor	Reconnaissance	Bombers
NATO	1,950	740	285	-
WARSAW PACT	1,920	4,370	600	350

N.B. Many interceptors can be used in ground-attack roles.

* *These totals include all aircraft of combat types including those in non-combat units as well as combat units (a criterion essential for arms control); all other numbers are based on aircraft in combat units.*

NATO-WARSAW PACT COMBAT AIRCRAFT QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS

SELECTED TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN EUROPE
(EXCLUDING MOSCOW AIR DEFENCE DISTRICT)



NB. A LARGE PROPORTION OF INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT CAN BE USED IN GROUND / ATTACK ROLES.
THE FIGURES MENTIONED ABOVE REFER TO COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS ONLY.

FIGURE 4

21. The land-based air forces, available in-place for NATO's Allied Command Europe, consist of 1,950 ground-attack fighter bombers, 740 interceptors and 285 reconnaissance aircraft. The few remaining United Kingdom Vulcan bombers no longer have a conventional role. The United States and Canada could reinforce rapidly with some 1,900 more combat aircraft, though airlift will be required for ground crew and equipment. The quality of NATO aircraft will improve with the continuing introduction of F-16 and as Tornado aircraft start to enter service. These have a greater all-weather capability than the previous generation of NATO aircraft, though the range and payload improvement is not as great as that gained recently by the Warsaw Pact. In respect of range and payload, NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft now have comparable characteristics. Fighter-bomber aircraft, in addition to fighting the air battle would have to assist NATO ground forces in repulsing a Warsaw Pact attack. NATO's military airlift assets consist of nearly 750 transport aircraft, which can be augmented by the civil air fleets of the United States and the other Allies. These are considerably larger than the civil air fleets available to the Warsaw Pact which, however, are centrally controlled.

22. NATO nations have made considerable progress in improving the ability of their air forces to operate and survive in a hostile environment, particularly by providing better protection for vital operational and logistical facilities. However, there would still be too few military airfields available under wartime conditions to operate all the aircraft that might be available at any one time and to provide for adequate dispersal of aircraft for survival. To a considerable degree, NATO air forces maintain a high state of readiness and are qualitatively superior to those of the Warsaw Pact in terms of training and weapon systems. The tactical flexibility of NATO air forces and the ability to augment in-place forces rapidly in time of tension or war are also positive factors.

23. Warsaw Pact forces have an extensive range of static and mobile air defences, including a variety of surface-to-air missiles and guns. As the following graphs show, the Warsaw Pact has three times as many anti-aircraft guns over 20 mm calibre as NATO, and a similarly high ratio of mobile surface-to-air missile systems (SAM). This, together with large numbers of interceptors, produces a very hostile air environment over and behind advancing enemy ground formations; this requires a combination of low-level tactics and electronic countermeasures for NATO aircraft. All this would make it very difficult to conduct operations successfully over and behind the battle area.

RELATIVE TRENDS IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND MOBILE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES

(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)



ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

20mm CALIBRE AND OVER



MOBILE TACTICAL SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS

EXCLUDING MAN-PORTABLE INFANTRY WEAPONS

FIGURE 5

Maritime Forces

24. As noted earlier there are fundamental differences in the respective missions of the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO resulting from the geographic and economic dissimilarities in the two alliances. The security of NATO nations depends on the unimpeded use of the sea both to link the potential of North America and Europe and to provide access for trade, raw materials and energy. As continental powers, the Warsaw Pact nations have far less dependence on the sea. The rôle of the NATO navies as for all NATO forces is in the first instance to deter aggression. They must be able to demonstrate a capability in peace and take action in war to preserve, protect and maintain the sea lines of communication, neutralize hostile forces, and to project maritime power in support of land and air forces. Conversely, the role of the Warsaw Pact navies would be to deny to NATO its use of maritime power and to hinder reinforcement. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact has the capability to carry out amphibious landings in North Norway, on the Baltic coasts and in Northern Turkey protected by its naval power and by Soviet naval aviation. Historical precedents demonstrate that the defence of the use of the sea demands far greater resources than the denial of its use, and thus the maritime balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be seen in this perspective.

25. Accordingly, in the Atlantic, NATO's emphasis would be on protection of reinforcement and supply shipping primarily from submarine attacks; whereas in the critically important Channel area the greatest risks to reinforcement and supply routes would be from submarines and mines, with Warsaw Pact aircraft and missile systems posing an additional hazard to Allied maritime forces.

26. Allied control of the Norwegian Sea in the event of conflict would have to be sufficient to inhibit access by Soviet naval forces into the Atlantic. It would also be necessary, in conjunction with land and air forces, to protect NATO's Northern Region as a whole, including Norwegian air and naval facilities, Iceland, Denmark and the Faroes and to control the Baltic Straits to prevent the Soviet Fleet from transiting to and from the North Sea and Channel areas.

27. The Iberian Atlantic area is of importance to NATO's defence because of the vital sea lines of communication to the NATO Southern Region and to sources of vital raw materials and oil.

28. In NATO's Southern Region itself, maritime forces have major tasks in defence of the region as a whole, supporting the land and air forces and maintaining the sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean in the face of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. They also have the task of securing the Turkish and Gibraltar Straits, in order to deny the Soviet Black Sea fleet access to the Mediterranean and to guarantee the flow of reinforcements and resupplies to NATO Southern Region respectively.

29. These and other differences in the respective naval missions for NATO and the Warsaw Pact are reflected in the different types and quantities of naval forces of the two alliances. Simple numerical comparisons of types of ships do not tell the full story and the naval balance may be defined in terms of the comparative ability of the naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to accomplish their respective missions in the face of opposition by the other side.

Warsaw Pact Naval Forces

30. The Warsaw Pact navies are equipped with a wide range of modern surface vessels, each of which is fitted with a range of anti-sub-

marine, anti-air missiles and some of which carry fixed-wing aircraft and/or helicopters. The capabilities of these surface forces are complemented by a force of land-based naval attack aircraft and an increasingly modern submarine force: the respective equipment of these forces include stand-off weapons and cruise missiles. Approximate numbers of Warsaw Pact naval forces expected to face NATO (i.e. excluding the Pacific Fleet) are shown below for both 1971 and 1981, to provide a trend in quantative changes:

Warsaw Pact

	1971	1981
Kiev class ships	0	2
Helicopter carriers	2	2
Cruisers	20	21
Destroyers and frigates	142	182
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats	553	551
Amphibious ships		
- Ocean-going	7	16
- Independent coastal craft	190	155
Mine warfare ships	374	360
Total Submarines (All types)	248	258
- Ballistic Missile submarines	38(1)	52(1)
- Long-range Attack submarines	115	149
- Other types	95	57
- -% Submarines nuclear powered	32%	45%
Sea-based tactical and support aircraft including helicopters	36	146
Land-based tactical and support aircraft (including some transport aircraft and transport helicopters)	521(2)	719(2)
Land-based Anti-Submarine Warfare fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters	225	179

(1) Also referred to in the section on Nuclear Forces.
(2) About 300 of these are bombers.

31. Together with the numerical increases in larger ships, submarines and attack aircraft, major qualitative improvements are being made in Warsaw Pact naval forces, particularly in submarines and large warships but also in naval aircraft. This has resulted in the transition of the Soviet Navy from a mainly coastal defence force to an offensive force capable of global power projection. These qualitative improvements are demonstrated by the number of new classes of Soviet major warships and

nuclear submarines in their construction programme. The Soviet Navy continues to develop its modern anti-ship missile forces by constructing four new classes of heavily armed missile cruisers and destroyers including the 25,000 ton nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov. In the Kiev class ships, the Soviet Union, for the first time, has sea-based fixed-wing Forger aircraft in operation. Soviet submarine development continues apace, with the high-speed, deep-diving Alpha class attack submarine, the huge cruise missile-equipped Oscar class submarine and the ballistic missile submarine Typhoon with a submerged displacement of at least 25,000 tons being outstanding examples.

Warsaw Pact Auxiliary Fleets

32. The Warsaw Pact merchant, fishing and oceanographic fleets are state-owned and under centralized command and control. This enables them to operate on a regular basis in support of naval forces. Particularly important are their intelligence gathering and logistic support operations. In wartime these assets would become even more valuable. Additional roles would then include support of amphibious operations and possibly minelaying.

NATO Naval Forces

33. NATO naval forces allocated to the Atlantic and European areas:

	1971	1981
Aircraft carriers	9	7
Helicopter carriers	6	2
Cruisers	11	15
Destroyers/frigates	381	274
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats	180	167
Amphibious ships		
- Ocean-going	24	41
- Independent coastal craft	62	69
Mine Warfare Ships	349	257
Total submarines	195	190
- Ballistic missile submarines	38(1)	35(1)
- Long-range attack submarines	72	60
- Other types	85	95
--% NATO submarines nuclear powered	50%	49%
Sea-based, tactical and support aircraft including helicopters	801	712
Land-based tactical and support aircraft	112	180
Land-based Anti-Submarine Warfare fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters	471	450

(1) Also referred to in the section on Nuclear Forces.

34. There have been major qualitative improvements in individual naval units and supporting systems of the NATO navies which are reflected both in new construction and modernization programmes. Included amongst such improvements are the capabilities of shipborne aircraft, anti-surface ship missiles, anti-submarine warfare detection systems, command and control, electronic warfare, and submarine noise suppression. The strategic missile submarine forces will become more powerful with the introduction of the OHIO class submarines and the Trident missile system. Despite these improvements, a steady decline in numbers of units has set a trend which appears to be continuing. This decline in numbers is further aggravated by the increasing age of whole classes of some NATO naval units particularly in destroyer and frigate categories.

35. The numbers in the tables comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact maritime forces reveal varying strengths and capabilities which reflect the different missions of the forces concerned. For example, NATO is strong in sea-based tactical air, land-based ASW/surveillance patrol aircraft, anti-submarine systems, long-range amphibious forces and endurance at sea through under way logistic support and nuclear propulsion. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact is particularly strong in anti-ship missile equipped ships, submarines, and land-based attack aircraft, as well as in torpedo-attack submarines and mines. Warsaw Pact naval forces have the geographic handicap of long access routes from Murmansk around the North Cape and the choke points created by the Baltic and the Turkish Straits. However, since NATO is a defensive Alliance, the Warsaw Pact has the initiative of time and place in deploying its forces and in interdicting NATO sea lines of communication. In these circumstances, a substantial numerical advantage is needed by the defending side.

36. NATO does not have this substantial numerical advantage, and this shortage of forces inside the NATO area is made worse by the assumption of responsibility by some Allied navies, particularly that of the United States, outside the NATO area in order to deter aggression and to respond to requests by nations for help in resisting threats to their security and independence. The effect will be that essential maritime tasks cannot be carried out concurrently and that the priorities will be imposed by the Warsaw Pact; moreover, a severe price might be paid in loss of control in certain regions of the Alliance including early shipping losses, until the Soviet naval threat is dealt with.

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Northern and Central Regions

Land Forces

37. Warsaw Pact forces facing this area consist of some 104 divisions drawn from the armies of the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland and deploying some 27,200 tanks and 19,500 artillery and mortar pieces. Two-thirds of these divisions are deployed in the forward area. In the far north the Warsaw Pact has two Soviet divisions. Further down within the same Military District are an additional 7 divisions including one airborne division. 95 divisions face the southern part of the Northern Region and Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact also has considerable amphibious capabilities in the Barents Sea and the Baltic.

38. Opposing the Warsaw Pact, NATO's in-place land forces in Europe are composed of armed forces from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The in-place land forces of NATO in this area consist of some 39 divisions including those forces in the United Kingdom, fielding about 7,700 tanks and 4,550 artillery and mortar pieces including prepositioned equipment. Most of these Northern and Central Region land forces are kept in a high state of readiness, but deficiencies include some maldeployment, and lines of supply which run too near and parallel to the border. Although all NATO formations are dependent in varying degrees on mobilization and redeployment, approximately 75% of these forces could be in position very quickly indeed. There are in addition 13 United States divisions in North America which together with their associated equipment and tanks, drawn from an overall total of some 5,000 tanks and 2,500 artillery/mortars, could be available to move to Europe in due course. Some of these could be allocated to the Southern Region. Up to three of the divisions would arrive quickly by air. Other United States divisions, with their equipment would arrive later by sea. A Canadian brigade group also would reinforce the area.

39. In total, over half of the 104 Warsaw Pact divisions in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Northern military districts of the Soviet Union could launch operations within a few days of mobilization. In the best situation, assuming simultaneous mobilization and deployment forward within the region, NATO could count on some 42 divisions, which would have to hold out until additional United States and Canadian forces arrive by sea. In the meantime, the Warsaw Pact forces could be quickly expanded to their full 104 divisions, plus a proportion of the 15 Strategic Reserve Divisions from the three Central Military Districts.

Air Forces

40. The Warsaw Pact is numerically superior in terms of fixed-wing tactical aircraft in this area. The NATO figures shown below include UK based aircraft and US aircraft based in Europe in peacetime. The high proportion of ground-attack fighter bomber aircraft in NATO air forces is partly required to counter the Warsaw Pact preponderance in armour on the Central Front. Against this force, however, the Warsaw Pact can deploy interceptor forces, many of which can also be used for ground attack, and exceptionally strong surface-to-air defence systems. Aircraft of the Moscow Air Defence District are excluded from the following table

because of their distance from the Northern and Southern Regions. Also some 1,900 United States and Canadian-based reinforcement aircraft, which are situated even further from these regions, are excluded.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS - IN PLACE AIR FORCES			
	FIGHTER/BOMBER GROUND/ ATTACK	INTERCEPTOR	RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
NATO	1,340	445	200
WARSAW PACT	1,580	2,595	415

N.B. Many interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

DEFENCE OF NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS



FIGURE 6

Southern Region

Land Forces

41. The Warsaw Pact has 10 Soviet and Hungarian divisions, equipped with over 2,300 tanks and approximately 1,400 artillery pieces which could be employed against North-East Italy. These divisions, located in Hungary, could be reinforced by seven more divisions including 2,000 tanks and 1,300 artillery pieces coming from the Kiev Military District. Warsaw Pact forces additionally include the equivalent of 3 divisions of airborne, air mobile and air assault troops which could be used anywhere within the region. Furthermore, options against the Central Mediterranean could be possible. NATO land forces consist of 8 Italian divisions with 1,250 tanks and 1,550 artillery and mortar pieces. The Italian forces are generally well deployed and improvements are planned to meet the support requirements for their reinforcement.

42. Approximately 33 Soviet, Romanian and Bulgarian divisions are available in the area north of Greece and Turkish Thrace. These forces are largely mechanized and are equipped with a total of 6,900 tanks and 5,300 artillery and mortar pieces. They are on terrain suitable for armoured offensive operations and could be reinforced by amphibious forces and by the Warsaw Pact airborne/air mobile divisions referred to above. NATO's 25 Greek and Turkish divisions in the area are mainly infantry. Their task is rendered difficult for defensive operations by the narrowness of the area between the borders and the Aegean.

43. There are 19 Soviet divisions which could be committed against Eastern Turkey equipped with about 4,100 tanks and approximately 4,000 artillery pieces. These forces could be reinforced by an airborne or air assault/ mobile division referred to above and by amphibious forces. The Turkish Army retains 8 divisions in North East Turkey. Four more divisions in South East Turkey are for use there protecting its extensive borders, but would be available for defence against the Warsaw Pact.

44. Greece and Turkey together have 3,900 tanks and 4,650 artillery pieces, in comparison with 11,000 tanks and 9,300 artillery pieces opposing them. The geographical separation of the Italian, Greece/ Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkish territories would make reinforcement and resupply among the respective theatres difficult particularly when lines of communication are under attack.

Air Forces

45. As with other regions, the flexibility of air forces renders comparison difficult. In-place forces available to the Warsaw Pact and NATO are approximately as follows:

SOUTHERN REGION - IN PLACE AIR FORCES			
	FIGHTER/BOMBER GROUND ATTACK	INTERCEPTORS	RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
NATO	610	295	85
WARSAW PACT	340	1,775	185

N.B. Many interceptors can be used in ground attack rôles.

The range of modern Warsaw Pact aircraft is such that they have the potential to operate anywhere in the Mediterranean, endangering the security of sea lines of communication which are of vital importance to the NATO nations in the Southern Flank. The geography of the Mediterranean emphasizes the inter-action between the maritime, land and air situations. The NATO naval forces and Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would have to face opposing land-based and naval aviation; naval operations would in turn greatly influence land/air operations in the three sub-regions. External air reinforcements from the Alliance could be of crucial importance.

DEFENCE OF SOUTHERN REGION



FIGURE 7

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE NUCLEAR EQUATION

46. As part of NATO's strategy, nuclear forces, in combination with conventional forces, exist to maintain peace through deterring aggression. To deter successfully, NATO's nuclear forces must be viewed by the Warsaw Pact as being credible. They must be, and be seen to be, capable of making an effective response, convincing a potential aggressor that in any attack against NATO the costs would outweigh any conceivable gains.

47. The primary role of nuclear weapons is deterrence. They are not generally direct military counters to each other. Thus, direct parity in every system is not needed. Individual nuclear weapon systems cannot be considered in isolation from other nuclear systems or from conventional forces. However, to avoid miscalculation by a potential adversary and to ensure preservation of stability and peace, there must be a balanced relationship in the overall capabilities between the nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in order that the credibility of NATO's deterrent is not called into question.

Note on Comparison of Nuclear Forces

48. The sections that follow (Strategic Nuclear Forces, Intermediate- and Short-Range Nuclear Forces, and Sea-Based Nuclear Forces) aim to present an assessment of systems that are broadly comparable and, where possible, to identify clearly discernible trends. In the strategic category, the systems compared are those considered to have intercontinental capabilities. In other categories comparisons are affected to a greater extent by qualitative and quantitative differences between forces which result in individual systems often not being directly comparable. The sections that follow list the numbers of aircraft, missile launchers and artillery tubes in each category; several of these operational systems are capable of firing additional missiles and warheads and aircraft are capable of performing more than one mission.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

49. Strategic nuclear forces comprise three elements - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and bombers. Each of these elements is different with respect to readiness, survivability, flexibility, accuracy and ability to penetrate enemy defences. These elements complement each other and thus the strategic forces must be viewed in their entirety.

50. NATO's strategic nuclear forces are provided primarily by the United States, but also include SLBMs deployed by the United Kingdom. On the Warsaw Pact side, the Soviet Union also maintains similar types of strategic nuclear forces and has over the past decade improved the quality to a significantly greater extent than NATO and has also substantially increased the number of these forces. Figure 8, which compares the main developments in strategic missile systems on both sides, depicts the recent momentum of the Soviet modernization. To ensure that stability is preserved in the future, programmes are now underway in the United States and the United Kingdom to ensure the continued adequacy of this essential part of NATO's overall deterrent.

51. The Soviets surpassed NATO in total destructive power (usually measured in megatons) in their strategic systems in the late 1960s and in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1973 (see Figure 9).

On the other hand, NATO has at present more strategic warheads but this advantage is diminishing (as Figure 10 shows) with the continuing Soviet deployments of multiple warheads, known as Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).

52. Today, the Soviets maintain a significantly greater proportion than NATO of their equivalent throw-weight capability (a rough measure of the ability to deliver large warheads) in ICBMs - about 62% compared to 31% for NATO. The Soviets maintain a significantly greater proportion than NATO of their megatonnage in ICBMs. Moreover, the sustained Soviet modernization of its ICBMs has given rise to particular concern as the newer warheads (especially those of the SS-18 and SS-19) are large and accurate enough to destroy United States ICBM launch sites (silos). Figure 11 shows that the Soviet Union has deployed a sufficient number of these ICBM warheads to have the potential capability to destroy most of the United States' ICBM silos while NATO, by contrast, does not have a corresponding capability against the Soviet Union's ICBM silos because of the relatively limited number of highly accurate warheads on its ICBMs and the hardness of Soviet silos. When considering NATO's strategic forces as a whole, this disparity in relative vulnerability of ICBM silos has to be viewed against the background of the higher survivability of submarines and bombers. NATO's strategic submarines are virtually invulnerable at sea. Also strategic bombers can have relatively high survivability to a surprise attack by maintaining a high state of readiness (although these aircraft must still face heavy Warsaw Pact air defences). In their entirety, the overall survivability and complementary characteristics of NATO's strategic nuclear forces guarantee the Alliance's ability to threaten retaliation, thereby ensuring deterrence.

Intermediate- and Short-Range Nuclear Forces (3)

53. Besides their strategic nuclear forces, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have a variety of other systems, of less than intercontinental range, which are capable of delivering

(3) This terminology is consistent with that used in the arms control negotiations currently taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union; these forces were previously covered under the term theatre nuclear forces.

STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES



* Currently undergoing sea trials

** Currently undergoing flight tests

(1) Thirty-one United States Polaris submarines were refitted to carry Poseidon missiles; twelve of these submarines are being further modified to carry the Trident I (C-4) missile.

KEY :

ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SLBM = Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SSBN = Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine

FIGURE 8

TOTAL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS



(a) USSR figures include Soviet strategic missiles and BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE bombers; the BACKFIRE bomber has been included in this figure because it has an inherent intercontinental capability although in its maritime and European land-attack rôles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.

(b) NATO figures include United States strategic missiles, 64 British strategic POLARIS SLBMs and United States B-52s and FB-111s. The United States-based FB-111 is included because it has a strategic mission.

FIGURE 9

STRATEGIC WARHEADS



* - *If all USSR missiles were MIRVed to their tested capability the number of Soviet warheads would total some 8500.*

FIGURE 10

LAND BASED ICBM VULNERABILITY



In order to assure a high probability of destroying a hardened ICBM silo, two high-yield and high-accuracy warheads must be employed. Only the US Minuteman III and the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs carry warheads with the requisite yield and accuracy. As the graph depicts, the US currently has about 1650 warheads deployed on Minuteman IIIs whereas the USSR has over 4800 warheads deployed on SS-18s and SS-19s (assuming maximum tested capability).

FIGURE 11

nuclear weapons. These include Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF). INF and SNF systems consist of land-based missiles, tube artillery and aircraft. There are major differences between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has a substantial numerical advantage. This is particularly significant in the case of land-based missiles because these have a better penetration capability than aircraft and aircraft form the greater proportion of NATO's INF.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Longer-Range INF Missile Systems

54. The Warsaw Pact has deployed in the Soviet Union a large force of these land-based missiles consisting of the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5. Despite the substantial Soviet build-up NATO presently has no missiles in this category as Figure 12 shows. The capabilities added to Warsaw Pact forces by the deployment of the mobile SS-20 missile which became operational in 1977 were a particular source of concern that contributed to the NATO 12th December 1979 dual-track decision to deploy PERSHING II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and to pursue arms control negotiations involving these systems between the United States and the Soviet Union.

55. Figure 13 depicts the global number of land-based missile warheads in this category. While the number of Soviet missile-launchers has remained roughly the same in recent years (because a number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles have been retired as the SS-20 has been deployed) the number of warheads on launchers has increased considerably during the period (because each SS-20 has three warheads, each of which is independently targetable). The number of SS-20 warheads has doubled since December 1979 (when NATO decided, as part of its dual-track decision, to deploy 572 PERSHING II and GLCMs) to about 900 currently. These, together with the 300 warheads on the remaining SS-4 and SS-5 missiles make a total of about 1,200 missile warheads. Deployments of SS-20 launchers show an overall rate of one per week. By comparison, NATO's deployment is not scheduled to begin until late 1983 and will not result in an increase in the total number of nuclear warheads in NATO Europe.

56. SS-20 missiles are deployed both in the European Soviet Union and in the Eastern USSR. Significantly, most of those deployed east of the Ural Mountains (i.e. outside Europe) can strike substantial portions of NATO Europe. Even those deployed in the eastern-most locations can reach NATO Europe (see Figure 14). Moreover, SS-20 missiles are readily transportable and could be relocated westward at short notice. NATO's longer-range INF missiles are planned for deployment in Europe. Figure 15 shows that the PERSHING II could strike targets only as far as the western-most military districts of the Soviet Union, but not Moscow and beyond. The GLCM has a longer range than PERSHING II but is not capable of reaching targets as far as the Ural Mountains or further to the East. Furthermore, these systems do not present a threat to Soviet ICBM forces, since most of the silos are extensively hardened or are beyond the reach of NATO's systems (see Figure 16); in addition, the limited numbers planned for deployment and, in the case of cruise missiles their long flight time of several hours, makes them unsuitable for such use.

Shorter-Range INF Missile Systems

57. Warsaw Pact shorter-range INF missile systems such as the Soviet SS-12/22s and SCUD could, especially if deployed forward, attack many of the same targets covered by the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5. The Warsaw Pact has deployed approximately 650

SS-12/22s and SCUDs compared to NATO's 180 PERSHING 1a's, which would be reduced to 72 upon deployment of PERSHING II. In addition, the Soviet Union has developed the SS-23 Missile, which has a longer range than the SCUD Missile for which it is a follow-on. Thus, the Warsaw Pact has a substantial numerical advantage over the whole range of INF missile systems.

INF Aircraft

58. The ranges of aircraft vary considerably depending on how the aircraft are flown and how much they are carrying. Normally, the majority of INF aircraft carry only one warhead but some types of aircraft, particularly those with longer ranges, can carry a second or third warhead. Their coverage is dependent on the location of suitably equipped bases. The comparisons that follow in this section cover land-based aircraft* located in NATO Europe and, in the case of the Warsaw Pact, opposite NATO Europe. The BACKFIRE bomber has been included in the strategic section because it has an inherent inter-continental capability although in its maritime and European land-attack rôles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.

59. Comparisons of longer-range INF aircraft in operational units show that the Warsaw Pact has a considerable numerical advantage. NATO has about 200 F-111s and VULCAN aircraft; the Warsaw Pact has about 400 BADGERs and BLINDERs in its long-range aviation and an additional 250 aircraft of these types in its naval air forces making a total of 650 aircraft. Of these, about 500 are in use as bombers, and about 100 aircraft in long range aviation and about 50 aircraft in the naval air forces are trainers that can be used on combat missions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union maintain aircraft of these types outside Europe (in the United States and in the Soviet Far East, respectively).

60. Most of the types of combat aircraft of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are technically capable of delivering nuclear weapons but not all of these aircraft would be available for nuclear use for a variety of reasons. A substantial portion of these aircraft would be assigned to conventional missions and not all pilots who fly these aircraft are trained to deliver nuclear weapons. Taking these factors into account, it is estimated that overall the Warsaw Pact could employ up to 2,500 INF aircraft in a nuclear rôle. On the NATO side, the number is about 800 (see Figure 18). Thus the Warsaw Pact has a significant numerical advantage over NATO with regard to aircraft available for employment in a nuclear rôle.

Short-Range Nuclear Forces

61. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) consists of tube artillery and missiles of much shorter maximum range than is the case of INF missiles. Most SNF on both sides are capable of being used to deliver either conventional or nuclear weapons. Figure 19 gives an assessment of NATO and Warsaw Pact SNF systems that could have a nuclear rôle. NATO has an overall numerical advantage in these systems. However, the Warsaw Pact has more land-based short-range missile launchers, with some 650 FROG/SS-21s against about 100 LANCE and HONEST JOHN on the NATO side; the greater range, and consequently the improved target coverage and survivability, of land-based missiles more than compensates for NATO's numerical advantage.

Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

62. The sea-based strategic systems

* *Carrier-based aircraft are dealt with under Sea-Based Nuclear Forces in paragraph 62.*

of both sides were discussed in paragraphs 49 to 52 and land-based INF aircraft with a primary maritime mission are included in paragraphs 59 and 60. In addition, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have other sea-based nuclear systems; these are an integral part of naval operations. The nuclear capabilities of these naval forces consist of air defence, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare systems and are designed to support the general mission of these forces as described in paragraphs 24 to 36. On the NATO side, these include the TERRIER surface-to-air missile, the ASROC and SUBROC anti-submarine missiles, and air-delivered bombs. The Warsaw Pact has air delivered bombs and SS-N-3, SS-N-7, SS-N-9, and SS-N-12 varieties of anti-ship cruise missiles. There are also, on the NATO side, A-6 and A-7 aircraft aboard United States aircraft carriers which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons against targets ashore; these, however, do not have this as a primary mission and at any one time only a portion would be in range of land targets. Also on the Warsaw Pact side, the Soviet Union has a small number of SS-N-5 non-strategic ballistic missiles on board submarines.

CURRENTLY DEPLOYED
LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE SYSTEMS

NATO

None

Warsaw Pact
(All missiles are located in the USSR with Soviet Forces)

	SS-4	SS-5	SS-20
Warheads	1	1	3 MIRV
Range (km)	2,000	4,100	4,400–5,000
Operational Mode	Fixed	Fixed	Mobile
Global Number Deployed*	275	25	300
Year Operational	Late 1950's	Early 1960's	1977

*Excludes refire missiles

FIGURE 12

LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE WARHEADS

(GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS)



Includes operational SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20.
There were no NATO deployments during this period.
Excludes retire missiles and additional warheads.

NATO decided on 12 December, 1979 to deploy 572 missiles (108 Pershing IIs and 464 GLCMs) beginning at the end of 1983; implementation of this decision can be altered only by a concrete and effective arms control agreement; these deployments will be cancelled if the Soviets will dismantle all their SS-20 missiles and retire all their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

FIGURE 13

COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM SS-20 BASES EAST OF THE URALS

FIGURE 14

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NATO GLCM AND PERSHING II COVERAGE



FIGURE 15

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TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET SS-20 AND TARGET COVERAGE OF NATO PERSHING II AND GLCM

FIGURE 16


NATO
WARSAW PACT
VULCAN
F-111
TU-16
(Badger)
TU-22
(Blinder)
YEAR
OPERATIONAL
1955
1967
1954
1962

FIGURE 17

LAND-BASED INF AIRCRAFT IN 1981 (a)



(a) Numbers include land-based maritime aircraft.

(b) The BACKFIRE bomber has been included in the strategic section because it has an inherent intercontinental capability although in its maritime and European land-attack rôles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.

FIGURE 18

NUMBER OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF) AT END OF 1981 (a)



(a) For NATO the data reflect forces deployed in NATO Europe; for the Warsaw Pact, forces facing NATO Europe.

FIGURE 19

COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT ECONOMIC POTENTIAL (1979)

63. A comparison of military capabilities would be incomplete without a look at the underlying economic factors. Economic strength is the ultimate foundation on which military power is based. But economic strength does not automatically translate into military power. The proportion of the economic potential which actually is used for military purposes and the way in which this is done provides an indication of the priority given to defence as against other claimants on economic resources. The most common overall measure is gross national product (GNP) which measures essentially a country's total economic output of goods and services in a given year. A key indicator of national priorities is the share of GNP allocated to the military in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

64. In NATO countries, governments have to justify their expenditures before parliaments and detailed defence budgets are subject to public debate and scrutiny. The Warsaw Pact countries in general only disclose a single budget entry under the heading of defence. These figures are very much open to question, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union, which accounts for the bulk of military spending in the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet Union claims that its defence spending is just over 17 billion roubles and has declined slightly since 1972. In view of the scale of the Soviet effort and the observed increases and improvements in virtually all areas of Soviet military power, no independent expert or body accepts these figures.

65. Using the agreed NATO definition of defence expenditure NATO experts estimate that actual Soviet military spending in current prices is about five times their published figure and that in 1980 it had increased to about 12-14% of Soviet GNP. So far NATO experts have not estimated the real military expenditure of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact in the same detail. But, preliminary studies suggest that the published defence budgets of the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states exclude appreciable amounts of military cost. According to independent academic analysis(4) since 1973 overall Warsaw Pact military expenditures have stood at about 11% of the countries' combined GNP. NATO member countries as a group, on the other hand, have spent less than 5% of their GNP on defence.

66. While the officially announced Soviet budget declined during the past decade, it is estimated that the real trend of Soviet military costs has been one of fairly steady growth at an average of 4% per year in real terms during the same period. This rate of increase is over twice that of the NATO countries. Owing to such problems as the lack of reliable information on true non-Soviet Warsaw Pact defence spending, widely differing pricing systems and the absence of valid exchange rates between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, conclusive comparisons of total NATO and Warsaw Pact defence spending - expressed in a common currency, whether in dollars or roubles - are not available.

67. As for future trends, notwithstanding increasing economic and financial constraints the standing Allied commitment to the 3% formula guidance for real increases in

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(4) Thad Alton et al published in "East European Economic Assessment Part 2" - A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 10th July 1981, paragraphs 409-433.

defence spending has been reaffirmed. The Warsaw Pact countries do not announce their long-term military spending plans. However, NATO studies based on a detailed analysis of Soviet military programmes show that the USSR's military expenditure is likely to rise at or above 4% a year in real terms until at least the mid-1980s. Moreover, Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed that they will make available whatever resources are required for defence.

MILITARY PRODUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES

Production

68. Comparisons of production capabilities are not easy to make, because it is difficult to find like items for comparison. The Soviet Union dominates armaments production in the Warsaw Pact and possesses a military industrial base which is by far the world's largest in terms of physical size and numbers of facilities. Soviet production far outweighs that of the other Warsaw Pact countries and largely accounts for the fact that in contrast to NATO a high proportion of Warsaw Pact materiel is considerably standardized. Soviet arms production in contrast with Soviet consumer-oriented industries is also characterized by a high level of quality and effectiveness.

69. There is no centralized procurement in NATO. Several of its members possess advanced armaments industries, which both compete and co-operate in producing equipment to meet NATO needs. These armaments industries are able to draw heavily on the more advanced civilian technologies of the West to improve their products. The relative fragmentation of production facilities as between sovereign nations means that standardization is harder for NATO to achieve. This also results in small production runs with higher unit costs.

70. The Soviets have recently embarked on a new and very ambitious programme of procurement which is remarkable in that it embraces all aspects of military capability. They are engaged in continuing expansion of their industrial capabilities to further these aims. Such expansion has long been a feature of the USSR's armaments industries.

71. Construction at the Severodvinsk Naval Ship Yard on the White Sea is a striking example of the growth of Soviet production facilities over time. In the past decade, floor space has been increased by approximately 75% to facilitate the production of seven classes of submarine. This is the largest of five Soviet yards which together in the period 1979-1980 produced 23 submarines. By way of comparison, United States production in the same period was two submarines.

72. The Soviets produced 3,000 Main Battle Tanks in 1980, with one plant alone constructing 2,500 of this total. Again, by way of comparison, the United States produced 740 Main Battle Tanks in the same period. In the aerospace industry, even though there has been significant expansion of existing plants in recent years, including several new large final assembly buildings, further expansion is in hand and the Soviets have revealed that they are constructing a wholly new large aircraft plant at Ulanovsk, west of the Urals. The production capability provided by such plants enables the Soviet Union to produce a wide variety of armaments in greater quantities than any other nation.

73. NATO countries are also modernizing their armed forces, and new generations of weapon systems, such as the multi-role F-16 fighter aircraft, are being introduced in order to maintain NATO's posture of deterrence in both the conventional and nuclear fields. The production of this equipment generally takes place in advanced and efficient plants, but these have not grown significantly over the years. Production runs are smaller, and the output of military equipment does not exhibit the degree of continuity witnessed in the Warsaw Pact.

Technology

74. Technology is an important gauge of industrial and military strength. However, the differences in the level of military technology between NATO and the Warsaw Pact cannot be usefully summarized in general terms since the picture varies from one technology or weapon system to another. Any discussion of technology differences is inevitably selective. Nevertheless, a comparison of trends shows that the Soviet Union, the technological leader of the Warsaw Pact, is making significant progress in areas where NATO has previously been leading. Moreover, whenever it considers it to be to its advantage, the Soviet Union does not hesitate to take advantage of the open character of Western technology and to make every effort to copy those technologies in which it believes itself to be seriously lagging behind the West.

75. NATO countries are strong in most areas of advanced technology. However, the Soviet Union is determined to improve its technology base, and this is illustrated by its educational priorities. Approximately 80% of Soviet doctorate level degrees in the 1980-81 academic year were in scientific and technical fields. The United States in the same period granted a similar number of doctorates, but only about 40% were in technical fields.

76. In a military context what is important in this sphere is the level of technology that is actually embodied in equipments in the field. The Soviets have adopted a policy of swiftly incorporating advances in technology into their weapon systems in an evolutionary fashion. The situation today in applied military technology is that the Soviets have caught up with NATO in some areas and, indeed, overtaken it in a few.

EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR DATA IN THIS PUBLICATION

Sources

1. Sources of data for NATO forces have been taken from national annual reports to NATO Headquarters. These reports do not necessarily reflect all the forces of each nation, but only those forces allocated to NATO. For example, some nations reserve a proportion of their forces for national purposes in areas outside Europe. Accordingly, figures in this publication have been supplemented with additional information, which has permitted the overall global context to be set out. Similarly, whereas Warsaw Pact data for the European area is from generally agreed Western intelligence sources, additional information has been obtained to show the Soviet Union's global strength in the Far and Middle East and other locations where Warsaw Pact forces are known to be. Details are in paragraphs 10 and 11.

Conventional Forces Counted

2. In general, the forces counted are those at present in place in Europe (assuming mobilization, since some units on both sides have only a cadre strength in peacetime). In other words, to ensure fairness of treatment and except where specifically stated both United States and Canadian trans-Atlantic reinforcements have been excluded on the one hand, while the Soviet Strategic Reserves from the Moscow, Ural and Volga Military Districts have been excluded on the other. The forces set out below and used for the comparisons in this publication come from the European continent, from the North Cape in the north to Gibraltar in the south, and Iceland and the British Isles in the west to the Ural Mountains in the east (less the three Soviet military districts mentioned above).

(a) For NATO

(i) The Northern and Central Regions

The indigenous ground and air forces of Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom (including those in the UK), the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany, plus the forces of the United States and Canada stationed in those countries.

(ii) The Southern Region

The ground and air forces of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey (split into three geographically distinct sub-regions).

(b) For the Warsaw Pact

The indigenous ground and air forces of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, plus all Soviet forces stationed in those countries and in the Leningrad, Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian Military Districts (MDs) and Archangel, Minsk and Leningrad Air Defence Districts (ADDs) of the Soviet Union are considered in the Northern and Central Regional balance. The Southern Region includes the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Soviet forces stationed in those countries together with Soviet forces from the Kiev, Odessa, North and Trans-Caucasus MDs, and Kiev, Baku and Sverdlovsk ADDs. Excluded are Soviet forces in the Moscow, Volga

and Ural MDs (considered as the Soviet Strategic Reserves), and Moscow Air Defence District together with all else to the East of the Ural Mountains.

(c) Naval Forces

Because naval forces frequently move from one sea area to another and must return to port for replenishment and refits, it is difficult to be precise on the relative strength of the NATO and Warsaw Pact fleets in European waters at any one time. For NATO, the greater part of the European navies has been taken to be permanently within European waters (though here again not all NATO nations assign all their naval assets to NATO). The United States has the 2nd and 6th Fleets committed to the support of NATO in the Atlantic and Mediterranean respectively; but parts of the 6th Fleet are currently detached out of the NATO area into the Indian Ocean. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact navies generally remain in European waters, but the Soviet Union occasionally practices deployments outside the NATO area from its Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. On balance, the nearest correlation used in this publication has been to subtract the Pacific Fleet from each of the United States and Soviet total naval forces, and count all of the remaining NATO and Warsaw Pact navies - and this is what has been done in paragraphs 24 to 31.

(d) French forces

Although France is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance it does not participate in its integrated military structure. No account of French forces has therefore been taken.

Nuclear Forces

3. In the section on Nuclear Deterrence and the Nuclear Equation (paragraphs 46-62) the rationale for the data given is explained in the text. Equivalent throw-weight (used in figure 10 and paragraph 52) is a technical term which refers to the carrying capacity of missiles or bombers. In assessing equivalent throw-weight, different parameters are applied to different systems.

NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN EUROPE
AND SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS

FIGURE 20

The CHAIRMAN. At this time, we are pleased to call on the subcommittee chairman of the Western European Affairs Subcommittee, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Eagleburger, let me say at the outset that I agree with the point of view that you have expressed. I think it would not be responsible to follow through on any of the five suggestions that you have noted that the Appropriations Committees may have considered; in some cases, have already passed upon.

But let me double back to the type of debate I think we are having on this issue. It seems to me that those of us who are mixing it up on the issue come up against two thoughts raised by those who are proposing these cuts, one of which is that defense spending in general is too high and that every aspect of it must be examined. And specifically, this is a good place. Some proponents of cuts in defense spending feel it would be a good place to look because they would contend that those who are being helped; namely, Europeans, are not doing their fair share.

So we keep going back over the burden-sharing argument. And as you suggested in your testimony, making some small cut of this variety might be a spur for them to do more.

Now, you have rejected that idea out of hand in your statement, that if we did less, that Europe would do less. But this will not be, I think, a convincing argument to those who are proposing reductions because they would say why. It is their homeland, factories, and people that are to be defended. Why should, in any way, a cutback, a small one, on our part be a stimulus for them to do less? Indeed, why should we believe your testimony that it is incumbent upon us and other NATO leaders to convince European parliamentarians that they ought to defend themselves, quite apart from people in Europe?

I think this is sort of at the heart of the matter. And you have made a comment that they have pretty well upheld a constant flow of defense expenditures. The 3 percent goal may not have been met, but as staff work on our committee has indicated, in most years NATO as a whole and seven out of nine countries specifically have achieved 2 percent or better increases, and we have come awfully close to the 2.8 increase which NATO regards as "in the region" of 3 percent.

The question still comes back—and it is a nagging one—does the United States of America have to convince European leaders and parliamentarians and their publics that they need to be defended against the Soviet Union? And if we cannot really ever get across that point, why shouldn't we do something that would raise their attention level and get them on the ball?

Now, how do we best respond to that question and debate?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Well, let me try to respond. Whether it is the best response, we will see.

With regard, if I may, first of all, Senator, to the question of defense spending being too high in general and that this is a good place to look, then, for some cuts, I would argue fairly strenuously—and I tried to indicate in my opening statement—that in fact, the amount of savings is not very much. And $150 million, $200 million, but it is in that range somewhere, and it is not very much.

It does, it seems to me—and I will come to your second question in a moment—it does, it seems to me, raise the question about the firmness of the U.S. commitment with regard to Western Europe and to NATO. It raises questions in European minds about whether this is the beginning of a reduction over time and further reductions over time in U.S. support for NATO.

As I indicated earlier, it would be the first time we have, in the history of the alliance, legislated a reduction. And I think that—I do not care if it is 5,000 troops or 18,000 or 20,000—again, that fact of a legislated reduction I think will have a major impact on attitudes in Europe.

And beyond that, Senator, I would point out again as I tried to in my statement, that some of the cuts in fact work against the very programs where we have laid out over time for the Europeans, areas in which we feel they ought to improve their contribution. They have followed our leadership, they have improved their contribution, and we now strike at the very programs we have told them they ought to proceed with over time.

Now with regard to the second question, and it is the toughest one to answer and I make no argument about that, why should we do more if they will not do more; why, if we reduce, won't they, because it is their country, feel they should do more?

The answer to that I think, Senator, is a complex one. It is my judgment that if we reduce our commitments it is unlikely that the Europeans would fill the gap and would do more. I would hope I am wrong, but I do not think I am. I think that is my judgment.

Now, whether that is a proper European response, I would have to admit it would not be a proper European response. I am faced with the fact, I guess, Senator, that yes, whether we like it or not we are leaders of this alliance. We have our own views of the Soviet threat. They are not always totally shared in Europe. I think they are by and large shared by most of the political leadership, but I think it is fairly clear when you look at the number of people on the streets in the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, debating the question of nuclear weapons in INF, that there is a division of view in Europe.

I suppose there is a division of view in the United States, too, but I think it is less apparent. We are leaders. Our steadiness is important. Our leadership is important, and just because you can make the argument that the Europeans will not react the way they ought to if we reduce, does not automatically, it seems to me, lead you to the conclusion that therefore, it is hopeless and we should reduce.

That is not a terribly satisfactory answer, Senator, but I am afraid we are stuck with the fact that we are leaders of this alliance and that steadiness on our part is absolutely critical.

Senator LUGAR. I think that is an honest answer and probably the correct answer; that we are leaders, that steadiness is important, that we can not be rattled by each of these arguments, and that in fact, there are within the alliance a good number of people who share our point of view and who have been courageous in their advocacy of doing more. Indeed, the recent visit of Helmut Kohl indicates one who has enthusiasm really for proceeding, which is an important thing to note.

Let me just ask this question, not as one leading the witness but maybe you can offer some further light. Are there going to be $150 million of cost savings? As a matter of fact, many analysts would suggest that if you withdraw 18,900 troops—if that is the number to be withdrawn—you have got to position them somewhere, house them, feed them, move them, that as a matter of fact, by the time we have ended up with this punitive operation we will have spent a great deal more than $150 million.

As a matter of fact, when an analysis was made by the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] a while back as to what we would save taking 70,000 troops out of Europe, they thought about $400 million at the time, but repositioning them they figured would cost $10.4 billion. So, we would have "shown the Europeans," at least to the tune of $400 million in savings, but spent $10.4 billion in doing so.

I do not know whether the Appropriations Committee seriously examined the implications of what was occurring, but what is your analysis of what kind of money is truly involved? And leaving aside the qualitative aspects of the cruise missile situation which would be seriously jeopardizing our negotiations, quite apart from any moneys that are involved.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, this is a direction in which I am glad to be led. Let me start with that.

The $150 million figure that I cited is on the basis of some estimates done in the Defense Department, but let me ask Mr. Bader to respond in more detail to your point.

Mr. BADER. Senator, we have done some preliminary analysis on this question, and you are quite right. Bringing a group of U.S. servicemen back to the United States would, indeed, add costs. It would not reduce costs.

But similarly, some of the programs that—such as the POMCUS program which goes at the heart of one of our dilemmas which is pre-positioning equipment for our reinforcing forces—in order to have that same capability; that is to say, in order to get that equipment there in time to participate in a war, would mean that we would have to greatly extend our airlift capability.

So on the cost effectiveness analysis that we have done, it is far cheaper to pre-position the equipment and not have the additional expense of additional airlift. As it is now, we are sadly deficient in that category.

It seems to me, Senator, that what we have are two conflicting goals that both the executive branch and Congress deeply hold. One is that we want our European allies to do more, but the second goal—and there is tension between these two goals—is that based on the lessons of the first and second World Wars, we know that Europe is vital to the security of the United States. The attitude of Congress and succeeding administrations since World War II is to maintain a viable defense posture in Europe as a deterrent against the consequences that we suffered in World Wars I and II.

That situation has not changed. As we discussed earlier, that situation is worse. So in balancing out these two goals of how do we get the Europeans to do more, to take your word that I agree with as a characterization, putative measures are not always the most

effective means to getting greater participation. And it flies against the logic of our being there in the first place.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Very telling points, I think. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I made several points in my prepared statement that I briefly will summarize. I think we do need to keep pressing on the burden sharing. I agree that now is not the time to be cutting things off or to be withdrawing troops out of Europe, although I do have some of the same reservations about our longer term commitment that some other Members of the Senate have.

I also make some statements in there about how while our U.S. defense effort was suddenly declining as a percentage of GNP, most of our U.S. allies held relatively steady all throughout the seventies, which is a point you made in your opening statement, also.

I also think that if U.S. defense efforts are to shift marginally, that this is the wrong way and the wrong time to make changes like this. If our defense efforts are to shift marginally over the longer term—and I certainly do not reject that out of hand—it should be part of a well thought-out, agreed-on alliance plan, and after obtaining allied agreement, not on some ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment amendment put in via a change in a budget amendment here without any real national debate on what we are really doing and what our commitments are. And that statement will be in the record in its entirety.

So I oppose the proposal. But having said that, I do have some difficulties, I guess, with some questions about our change of policy as I see it. Back in the Carter administration we had what was called a long-term defense program [LTDP], and we used sort of a report card approach, if you will, and we were going to have these meetings every year, and the associated members of NATO were going to be sort of called on the carpet to see what they had done. We really—it was a school m'arm approach, if you will, and we were going to see how everybody lived up to their commitments for that year.

Now, with the new administration when it came in, this changed over to one of a policy of quiet diplomacy. Secretary Haig maintained in his confirmation hearings that the Europeans were doing better than the United States in meeting NATO military needs, and called for what he called a far more sensitive approach rather than—and to quote him—"further fragmentation or crystallization of animosities," which is a fine-sounding phrase. Those are his words, not mine, where we would lead by leadership instead of the way we had been doing things, and some sort of strategic consensus was going to come out of this.

Now the LTDP seems to have waned, and at the 1982 NATO summit, the United States agreed to drop any reference to the 3 percent pledge from the final communique, settling, it said, for a less specific commitment to—and I quote—"fulfill to the greatest extent possible the NATO force goals for the next 6 years."

Now, that is pretty weak stuff, and I do not see that we are really keeping the pressure on to keep NATO more in line with

what we would like to see with regard to burden sharing. Why did we let up on that? Why did we make that change of policy? Was it just to make a change of policy because there was a new administration, or was the 3 percent goal figured to be unrealistic?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, I am going to ask Mr. Bader to discuss this in a minute, but let me make a couple of points. I was with Secretary Haig on the NATO meeting that you are referring to, and I know from talking with him what his view was and I want to try to explain, in other words, why the language was different.

We have not walked away from or dropped the 3 percent figure. It was Secretary Haig's view, however, that there was a problem with the 3 percent figure in the sense that it would become enshrined as all that was necessary. And when he went to the NATO meeting and when he talked with his NATO colleagues, the point he was making was not that we must not maintain at least the 3 percent, but that in fact, in some areas and in some cases we had to do better than 3 percent.

And therefore, his objective was not to walk away from 3 percent as a minimum, but his point was that in some cases we had to do more than that, and therefore, there was no specific reference to the 3 percent figure. In his judgment, it was not a weakening of the point; it was, in fact, an attempt to strengthen the point that more needed to be done.

Senator GLENN. I have talked personally to the some of the European leaders on this very subject, and it is not their impression that this was a call for them to go beyond the 3 percent. Is it your feeling that the Federal Republic of Germany feels that it is now called upon to do 4, 5 or 6 percent?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I think it is my feeling that the Federal Republic of Germany understands that the 3 percent figure is still at least what ought to be done, and that it is our view that in some cases, more than that has to be done. Yes, sir.

But now, with that having been said, if there is anything more that Mr. Bader would like to add on that point I will be glad to hear from him.

Mr. BADER. Senator, if I may add to that response, the impression that you have is based on the Bonn communique. But what the Bonn communique referred to was force goals which actually would require nations to do more than 3 percent. The force goals is a process where annually, every year NATO has to appear in much the same way as we do in the United States Congress before budget hearings where their performance over the past year is examined collegially by the allies in meeting force goals.

A long-term defense program has now been, over the last 4 years, absorbed into that planning. It has not been lost sight of; it still continues. But it is reported in the regular mechanism that was created by the alliance to report on what it has done and what it plans to do. So that actually, the Bonn communique referring to force goals was 3 percent plus, but this administration has not changed its attitude on 3 percent. It's a little different style, but the 3 percent remains in place, and I think all of the allies should understand that clearly.

Senator GLENN. I do not think they do.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I can assure you that Mr. Shultz in Brussels later this month will reinforce the point.

Senator GLENN. I hope so, because we have all been pushing for better burden sharing, and I hope that that is pushed.

Let me ask you this: In your opinion, is Europe shouldering its fair share of the NATO defense burden now?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No.

Senator GLENN. How much more should they do?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. To give you an exact figure, Senator, I could not give you a figure. The facts of the matter are I think—and again, I would come back in a sense to something that Secretary Haig said more than a year ago—we all need to do more. I think we are doing far better in the course of the last year or so in doing more.

I think it is, at a minimum, our strong view that the 3 percent figure should be met by all our European allies. If you want a figure, I would say at a minimum, that 3 percent figure should be met.

Senator GLENN. I hope we keep stressing that and the fact that it is a minimal—that we look at that as the minimum, not the maximum because I think there is general misunderstanding on that. And I think that taking that languge out or being unable to get agreement on that language in the communique was unfortunate because I think it sent some wrong signals to some of the people there.

Some of the other provisions of this proposal have not really been brought out adequately. I think you mentioned POMCUS, the pre-positioning of equipment, particularly for the POMCUS 5 and 6, sets 5 and 6, for the Fifth and Sixth American Division that would rush to Europe in some kind of a crisis. Have we ever asked the Europeans to contribute funds to provide for that pre-positioning?

Mr. BADER. The Europeans do provide funds for part of the POMCUS expenses. They provide the land which in some cases is considerable, certainly in the case of The Netherlands. Under the NATO infrastructure program, all the allies contribute to the construction of the facilities to house that equipment. But the provision of equipment has historically been the responsibility of each of the nations, so that this is our equipment and we intend to provide the equipment ourselves.

Senator GLENN. The next question may not be one you can answer and I can't answer it either, but I will ask it anyway. We've been over there now supporting Europe and NATO and making it, as you have termed in your statement, the first line of defense for some 37 years. Is this something that you see just going on in perpetuity in the long-term future? Or do you see any way in which we scale down sometime, or is this something that's going to be a 100-year occupation or whatever, into the indefinite future? It's been 37 years now. That's the longest time I think Americans have ever been anywhere in a situation like this and with forces, very major forces.

I think our forces in Europe are almost half of those of the Republic of Germany. So this is not just a token force. This is a major

combat force, some 37 years after the war. When is this going to end?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You are right, Senator, it is a question I cannot answer, but I will try anyway. Let me start by saying, it is true we have been there 37 years. It is also true, sir, that from 1945 to 1982 is the longest period of peace that Europe has had in this century. And I think there is a direct relationship.

With regard to how long we are there, nobody in the State Department ever looks more than 6 months ahead, but I will try. It would seem to me that if you examine the Soviets and where they are going and the Soviet threat, it cannot—it is not easy to be optimistic about seeing any substantial change in the character of the Soviet Union or that military threat to Western Europe.

I would say indeed—and guessing now—through the rest of the century. Beyond that I cannot go and even that is stretching it. Things can happen in 20 years or 10 years that none of us can foresee now. But to try to answer your question, I would have to say that my estimate would be that we would have to expect that to some degree and in some force we will have to be in Europe through the rest of the century.

Now, I cannot say nor would I say that it necessarily has to be the size of the forces we have now. As the Europeans improve, and as you indicated in your own statement, it may well be possible in some coordinated fashion, planned carefully with our allies, that over time we can reduce our forces as they increase theirs. I cannot make you a prediction on that at this time other than to say, in that sense it seems to me that what we have in Europe, more or less at the levels we now have, is certainly going to be required for some period of time yet.

Senator GLENN. I know my time is up. Let me make one very short statement here. I think the status has changed since World War II. We stayed over there post-World War II in order to bring stability to that area. The thing that has changed in the last few years is the new increased importance of the Persian Gulf, because we are taking on huge new commitments that are more to the benefit of Europe, really, than they are ourselves, as far as protecting energy supplies.

They get 50 percent of their oil out of the Persian Gulf on the average month. We get—we are a little less than 18 percent now, and Japan 75 percent. It is more important for Europe than it is for us. And we are taking that on. We are building new carrier task forces at $12, $13 billion a crack and taking on huge new commitments, and Europe has not shared in that. They have refused.

And I have tried for the last 2 years, at the Wherkunde Conference I have gone to, to impress on them the importance of this burden-sharing. If you are going to expect the American people to take on these additional loads on their behalf, then they have to do more and do more than that 3 percent. And I think this is a changing situation over the last couple of years, and it is a good time to press them to do more on their own behalf and maybe open the door toward us eventually getting out as we take on more global responsibilities that are also in their best interest.

I know that my time is up.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. May I comment on this, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is a terribly important point and it has not come up earlier and I think we need to comment on it, and that is the question of the Europeans recognizing that, for example in the Persian Gulf, we are taking on heavy responsibilities; that it is important for them to recognize that that is in their interest as well as our own.

Indeed, it is probably more in their interest than it is in our own; and it is going to take time, Senator; I cannot argue that it can be done overnight. But one of our objectives must be over time to make it clear to the Europeans that in fact their security and their responsibilities do not end in the continent of Europe.

Senator GLENN. And they will not admit that. They will not go outside the NATO area. They keep talking about staying within the NATO area.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, my point is that at this time that is basically correct. I do not think we can give up on it. I think we have to keep working on it. It is true that the French and the British have done some things in the Persian Gulf, for example, but NATO as an alliance has not, and I accept the point.

But we also have made the point to our European friends, we will continue to make it, that, as you say, times have changed, the demands on us have changed. It is a far more complex world now than it was, and they simply are going to have to get with us on this problem. I cannot debate the point.

Senator GLENN. NATO interests have broadened. They have not broadened their outlook with it. That is the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Glenn.

Senator Boschwitz, if you would not mind holding off just one moment. I will be called in a few minutes to testify on an Illinois project before another committee, so I am going to ask Senator Lugar if he would assume the chair.

I would like to reply to Senator Glenn, but I think he does have a point in that the Europeans do not fully recognize and give full credit to the tremendous efforts we have made to secure their oil supply, and I do not think that Japan does either. They are the first beneficiary of our Rapid Deployment Force, that has been very costly for us—an $11 billion expenditure to secure first the Japanese oil, second Western European, and third the United States. And yet the burden seems to fall entirely on us and we cannot give up, any of us. We and the executive branch cannot give up on that.

The Europeans do reply constantly, and I think it would be unfair not to mention here what they said to us at the North Atlantic Assembly, that the cost politically to them of conscription is a very high cost that we are unwilling to bear. Our reserves are culling down. They are maintaining their strength. And most of them have conscription in Europe. Most of those countries do provide a reserve of manpower that is extremely important. If they had to pay prevailing wages to their forces, it would increase Europe's defense cost $3.5 billion, and that is not reflected in the actual dollar figures.

One other thing that they point out is that they do provide a lot of real estate. In the Republic of Germany alone, the real estate

donation is valued at over $80 billion, and that is against say $27 billion that we have in the United States that we are providing for our common defense. And those points I think should be made to complete the record.

Senator GLENN. If I could inject one thing, the basic problem is that the NATO allies will not look beyond the NATO area in any of their considerations, and the world has changed and they are not changing with it. They are still talking about whether they have their conscription at home and that kind of stuff or not, while we are taking on the whole Persian Gulf on their behalf, and our behalf too, of course. And they will not budge one iota on their interest outside the NATO area as a way of saving money.

It is a good ploy, but I do not think we ought to be letting them get away with it. We ought to be pushing much harder.

The CHAIRMAN. We did spend a good deal of time on that subject, and with that I certainly concur completely with you, Senator Glenn. In the North Atlantic Assembly meeting, they know how strongly we feel about their lack of recognition of that.

Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, would you repeat that point about the real estate? That slipped by me there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. For the Federal Republic of Germany, the actual figure is that they contribute real estate occupied by NATO forces valued at about $80 billion. And in contrast to that, the total contribution of U.S. real estate—that is, the total worth of all bases in the United States—is $27 billion.

So Germany is by all odds the largest contributor of real estate, but it is to protect Europe. But we have to accept the fact that Europe is our first line of defense as well.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That $80 billion is supposed to be the worth of that real estate?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator GLENN. If you take all of our military land in this country and total it up, it is going to be a lot more than $80 billion, and that is on their behalf, too, where we do all of our testing and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. This is land that is used for NATO forces.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. $80 billion annually?

The whole military budget is $25 billion. They certainly do not lose that much annually.

Would you care to comment on that, Mr. Bader?

Mr. BADER. I think the figure that the Senator is using is correct, but it includes the infrastructure as well, the facilities, both the real estate and the facilities that the Federal Republic makes available to us.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That sounds like a gratuitous figure to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz, let me read one sentence from the Department of Defense report on allied contributions. "Germany is estimated to contribute real estate worth more than $80 billion for use by German and foreign forces, compared to some only $27 billion for similar facilities in the United States."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That is an interesting figure. I would think that that is by and large a gratuitous figure, really; $80 billion.

That is almost as much as their entire national budget. The entire national budget is $110 billion.

Mr. Bader, may I ask, what is the cost to the United States of our NATO commitment in dollars? I understand it may be difficult to determine in a precise manner, but what does it cost to maintain, whether it is 355,000 troops or 337,000 as I thought it was? What is the cost of our NATO commitment in the military budget?

Mr. BADER. Senator, you are quite right, there is no accurate way to measure.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is difficult to nail down. Give me a range.

Mr. BADER. You see, under the NATO definition actually all of the U.S. defense expenditure, whether or not those forces are clearly committed to NATO, we define as our defense expenditure for defense of the West. They even include the expenditures for our Coast Guard. Our security assistance program is also counted when NATO adds up the various contributions that the allies are making. So then we have—there is no scientific way, Senator, to answer your question as far as what expenditures we make are clearly for NATO, as opposed to something else.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, give me a non-scientific answer. According to "Foreign Affairs" in the spring of 1981, David P. Calleo estimates that $81 billion was spent by the United States on NATO defense in 1981. That seemed to me to be quite high. That is 40 percent or more of the entire defense budget.

But you must have some figure in mind.

Mr. BADER. The figure that I think you have in mind, Senator, is the $87.5 billion for those forces that would be in Europe and rapidly deployable to Europe.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It includes many figures. What does it cost to maintain our people in Europe and maintain our commitments to NATO that would be directly attributable to that?

Mr. BADER. Senator, the problem we always have in answering that question is that if you assume that those forces that we have in Europe are justified to have them deployed somewhere, whether or not in the United States or in Europe, most of the costs associated with that continue.

If you consider the cost of relocating those people and the infrastructure that would have to be created somewhere else back here, the costs go up significantly. We can provide you——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You could send everybody to Europe in that case; is that what you are maintaining? It has to cost us something. You have to be able to tell us to some degree that our commitments to NATO are this and this percentage of the defense budget. Do not tell us that we would have to have the men somewhere else. It certainly must be costly in some way to participate in NATO.

Maybe we should make the same points to the Germans and the Italians and to the British. Listen, you are going to have to spend the money somewhere. You may as well spend more money, because if you do not you are going to have to put the troops here or there and it would cost you more anyway.

Mr. BADER. Actually, it is a cost savings, Senator. But you see, there are various levels of forces committed to NATO. Some are theoretically committed without any other mission before them. Some are available to NATO, but they also have another mission.

So you run into the problem of, for example, the forces that we would send to Southwest Asia. If they were not in Southwest Asia, presumably then they would be available to go to NATO. So how do you calculate those? Are those forces for NATO or are those forces for Southwest Asia? Well, in point of fact they are forces for both.

We have some forces that are not committed in any way to NATO, that are out in the Far East. But presumably, as far as naval forces, those forces, if actually a Third World War were started in Europe, might be swung down to Europe to participate in that situation.

So you get into these definitional problems of what clearly is only for NATO, and what does that prove, what does that demonstrate? Why do you not take our whole defense budget, which is much larger, and NATO looks upon that as providing defense for the Western World, including NATO.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, if I may. Mr. Carlucci and I had this discussion some months ago before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and we went through the same agony in trying to answer what looks like a fairly clear question, for which there is obviously no clear answer. And we will try to get for you a figure for the record.

My recollection at the time of the discussion we had before the other committee was that, depending on your definition, it ranged somewhere between, I think it was, $50 and $80 billion. But we will have to check this, but it really depends very much on the definition.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Okay, fine. I accept that range in that case, $50 to $80 billion.

In your testimony, Secretary Eagleburger, you spoke very feelingly, as have some of the other Senators, about how the Europeans have held up relatively steady during the seventies. According to both Senator Glenn and you in your testimony, there was a 2 percent real growth. I point out to you that we are spending upwards of 6 percent of our gross national product on defense. The English are now spending 5 percent or 5.1 percent. The French are spending 3.9 percent, the Germans 3.2 percent, the Italians 2.4 percent.

So the gross level has certainly emanated from a very low level. If you take the English out, because the English have of late come up quite nicely, if you take the English out, would the 2 percent apply to the other NATO countries as well?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. The figures I have are in fact collective. But again, it depends on what year you are talking about, because for example, there was a long period——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No, not year. You said in your testimony that during the seventies we went down on a real basis 1 percent, their spending rose at a rate of 2 percent a year in real terms.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Right. My point is, Senator, that during a fairly large period of the decade of the seventies, in fact the British were down, for example in 1974 down 3.9 percent; 1976, down 2.1 percent. I cannot give you an exact figure, but my estimated answer—and we will get you an exact figure—is that we would not be too much off that 2 percent figure.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. There is a general frustration, as you know, in this country that these European countries, and particularly Japan, which we have a hard time getting to spend 1 percent of their gross national product on defense, though their new Prime Minister seems more inclined in that direction, that they are taking us to the cleaners in many trade areas and that at the same time we are providing a large amount, depending on the definition, $50 to $80 billion in the case of the Europeans, for their defense.

So there is a strong feeling in the Congress that we have to do something about the military budget. I have by and large been a supporter of the military budget, but we are seeking places to cut, seeking places to slow the growth; I think that would be a better way of expressing it. And if we get this very spirited defense every time we come with a proposal to save $150 million, which is three-tenths of 1 percent of your low figure of $50 billion, where are we going to cut, what are we going to do?

Where are we going to slow the growth? How are we going to get the Europeans to come up from 2.4, 3.2, 3.9 percent, or the Japanese from 1 percent?

There is a frustration, Mr. Secretary, that the Japanese particularly, the French most particularly, have, just like I say, taken us to the cleaners in areas of trade and yet we are providing so much for their defense. I suggest to Mr. Bader and to you, Mr. Secretary, that if this is not the right place to slow the growth of the defense budget, if we are to hear such a spirited defense of the defense budget for this $150 million cut—and I do not agree or disagree particularly—I would hope that the Department of Defense and the Department of State would come to us with some means of checking the very rapid growth in the defense budget.

Otherwise, Members of this Congress, Members of the Senate, are going to lash out in areas where you do not want us to lash out. This is something Members of the Congress are going to do. I really believe it would be in the general interest of our country, our allies, some of them who are, I call, our so-called allies, and the Defense Department and the State Department to achieve all of our common defense goals. I want to help them achieve these goals, but they must help us.

My staff is involved with some of the Defense Department staff in seeking to do that. But where do we cut in that case? What do we do?

Mr. BADER. Senator, as I said earlier and as Secretary Eagleburger has said, we share the goal of getting our allies to do more. And while the indictment you have just gone through is indeed true in many ways, we must not lose sight of the fact that the European performance over the 10 years that you are referring to, actually the U.S. share of the total alliance spending, including Japan, has been reduced.

Back in 1970, we were providing about 63 percent of what Japan and the alliance was providing. Now it is down to just slightly over half. So that is progress. It may not be as quick as we would like, as we both would like, but it is progress. The share of the U.S. contribution to the Western defense is being reduced.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. May I also say, Senator, that while again I do not debate the point that the allies need to do more, I

think with regard to the specific questions we are talking about here there is, first of all, at least in my view, a need to recognize that we are in Europe not because we are doing the Europeans a favor but because we think it is important to our own defense.

So that to some degree at least we need to recognize that the expenditures we go through every year are for the purposes of our own security, not simply to assist our European friends and allies.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I do not question that, Mr. Secretary. I repeat again my statement that if the Defense Department and the State Department wish to prevent the Congress from lashing out in areas that they feel are not appropriate—and perhaps this is such an area, and for $150 million of $50 billion, maybe it is not the place to take it on, and maybe there should be some more substantial cuts in other places—then we need help from the State Department and the Defense Department. Otherwise we are going to do things that you do not like and that may not be in the interest of ourselves and our allies.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I understand that, Senator. I do have to make one more point about these issues, which is that in fact in some of the cuts that we are discussing now, as I indicated earlier, we are striking at the very programs where in fact the allies have done and are trying to do more, in response to arguments we have made to them over the course of the last five or so years.

But I recognize that does not get to your basic point. But I do think these are very bad places to try to cut.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Pressler?

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Let me say that I identify with many of the remarks of Senator Boschwitz. I recently made a tour of our military forces in Germany and wanted to get in on the discussion about the amount of real estate in Germany. But in terms of contributing to our economy or contributing to the German economy, I think we would have to say that if we would relocate some of these troops in our own country they would stimulate our own economy. I think this is something we overlook, as well as the problem that taxpayers have in terms of paying for trips over to Germany, families, the support function. Also, I observed on many occasions that if a bridge was damaged by U.S. forces on maneuver my understanding was that we paid for the repairs, we were billed for it, and we make some kind of payments for use of roads and so forth.

So I really am confused by the various facts that are flying around about how much we are contributing. When you get into the real estate argument, indeed, the Chairman's figures sounded dramatic. But what about the stimulation of our own economy if we relocated those troops in our own country and the mobility they would have, the greater global mobility, and better morale?

I am also told that many of our troops in Germany are not combat-ready, and it is easier, in the opinion of many military people, to keep troops combat-ready within the continental United States. I just throw that out, and maybe that has already been covered. But especially in terms of the mobility and morale of troops,

would we not be better off with those troops in the United States, with the capability to move?

Mr. BADER. Senator, if I might, we did cover that.

Senator PRESSLER. If you covered it before, don't cover it again. I came in late and I will read the record. If you want, comment on it.

Mr. BADER. We didn't cover the question of the U.S. troops stimulating money into the United States economy. That indeed would be a fact. That is probably offset by both the relocation costs and the costs to us if they indeed were to perform their mission.

Senator PRESSLER. This is the relocation, the one-time relocation?

Mr. BADER. The one-time relocation.

Senator PRESSLER. Back to bases in the United States or a base in the United States. And certainly the amount spent by U.S. forces there and their families and going on tours and so forth would be an enormous stimulus to the German economy in terms of dollars spent. They say the dollars spent remultiplies itself three to seven times. I am not saying that is good or bad, but the point is that with our own unemployment problems I think we are exporting many jobs with our troops being stationed there.

Mr. BADER. But you see, Senator, the cost, then, of getting them back to Western Europe if they were to perform their mission, we would require an airlift capability that we do not have, which is part of our problem. And one of the reasons why we went forward with the POMCUS program is that the cheapest way on a cost-effectiveness basis for us to get our forces, our 10-division force there in 10 days would be to preposition the equipment.

Senator PRESSLER. We do not have that airlift capability presently?

Mr. BADER. Not of that magnitude, Senator.

Senator PRESSLER. I am told that we have the capability to move troops anyplace in the world, combat troops, where we are supposed to, including the Middle East.

Mr. BADER. You are indeed correct, but it is a question of quantity, how many troops we can move over what period of time. And part of the problem we have faced in attempting to project a viable deterrent posture in Europe is appearing credible to the Soviets, that indeed we could get to Europe fully armed and fully equipped and ready to go in a limited period of time. And we do not have the airlift to do that without POMCUSing, without maintaining our forces in Europe.

Senator PRESSLER. Have you heard specifically from the European officials yet with respect to the Stevens proposal? What has been their specific response in terms of their view of the U.S. commitment?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, we have heard a number of comments. It was raised by Mr. Kohl when he visited here, and he was obviously in opposition to it. We have heard from the British. Mrs. Thatcher herself referred to the Stevens Amendment recently in discussions with several members of this committee. She was strongly in opposition. I see today that there has been a communique issued by the West European defense ministers at the beginning of the defense ministers' meeting in Brussels, which again makes the point that from their point of view this is a bad idea.

Just to read you one brief point, "In a communique issued at the start of a 4-day NATO strategy conference yesterday, 12 West European defense ministers said that although Europe has about half the Alliance's population and gross national product, it provides about 75 percent of NATO's ground forces, combat aircraft, tanks, armored divisions and fighting ships in Europe. The communique was a reply to Senator Stevens and other Members of the U.S. Congress who say that the Europeans are not pulling their weight."

The communique then goes on to talk about some of the specific measures the Europeans intend to take over the course of the next year.

Senator PRESSLER. And so if you were to summarize the European officials' response, it would be what?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That they are uniformly negative with regard to all of the subjects I have tried to raise in my testimony today.

Senator PRESSLER. Okay. Now, the CDU-CSU government in West Germany has taken office with the pledge to strengthen German-American ties. What effect would a unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal have on the new chancellor's opportunities to bring about stronger ties?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I personally think, Senator, it would have a very serious negative impact. I think we have, in both Mr. Kohl and his defense minister, Mr. Woerner, people who are totally committed to increasing the German contribution to NATO. I think that is going to be a difficult issue for them politically within the Federal Republic of Germany, but it was clear they intend to do their best to in fact increase their contribution. If the United States is seen to be acting in a negative fashion with regard to its own contribution, I think it will make it more difficult for the new government to increase its own contribution.

Senator PRESSLER. Earlier this fall we had testimony here in the committee from the President of the European Parliament. He feared a U.S. move to take conventional forces out of Europe that coincided with a U.S. move to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe would be portrayed by the Soviet Union and the European peace movement as proof that America wanted to confine a future war to that continent and fight it with a minimum loss of U.S. servicemen's lives; that is, with nuclear weapons.

Do you share Mr. Dankert's concern? And second, to what extent do you believe that a U.S. troop withdrawal can undermine European resolve to go forward with the dual track decision on INF?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I think with regard to the first point, Senator, the gentleman has a point. It is a fine balance we have to be careful about, but I think it is a clear fact that to the degree the Western conventional defense in Europe is adequate or the degree to which it is improved means that if we should reach the point where a war was undertaken, it would put off the point at which we would have to go to nuclear weapons. The weaker the conventional defense, the more likely in case of war that we would have to react with nuclear weapons more quickly. So I think there is a point here. I think clearly that there would be an opportunity for the Soviets to play a propaganda game with regard to that point if,

in fact, we reduced our conventional forces while we were going ahead with the question of deploying the INF.

With regard to the two-track decision and the impact there, I think again a reduction of the U.S. involvement and commitment in Western Europe now would strengthen the hand of those in Western Europe who are opposed to going ahead with the deployments and would make it more difficult for those governments involved to in fact go ahead with the deployments.

I think indeed, in addition to the question of troop cuts, one of the things that concerns us the most would be the cut in appropriations for the ground-launched cruise missile and for the Pershing II, both of which are involved in that deployment in late 1983, and we hardly convinced the Soviets that we are serious about going ahead with those deployments in the absence of an ability to reach an agreement in Geneva by cutting funding for those programs.

So I think at the same time we are, in fact, undercutting Mr. Nitze's ability to negotiate an agreement in Geneva.

Senator PRESSLER. A final question following that up, related to what Mr. Nitze is doing in Geneva. ACDA Director Rostow has told the European press that he did not believe progress in the INF negotiations was likely until 5 minutes before the missiles are deployed. Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I might disagree slightly on his characterization of the time involved, but I think the point he was trying to make I would agree with completely. I think, Senator, that in looking at the Soviets and their attitude on the INF negotiations and deployments, they are unlikely to get serious in those negotiations until they are convinced that in fact the United States will go ahead with the deployments in the absence of an agreement and that the political situation in Western Europe is such that the Western European countries involved will be able to go ahead with the deployment as well; and what Mr. Rostow is really saying is that the Russians are not likely to come to those conclusions until somewhere down the road when they are convinced that both we and our Western European allies are, in fact, serious about these deployments.

Again I think, therefore, cuts in funding for those two weapons systems right now in fact tend to convince the Soviets to the contrary and are therefore very dangerous.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

By unanimous consent, the record of the hearing will be kept open at the request of Senator Mathias, who has a statement he would like to submit.

[Senator Mathias' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS

In November I was fortunate to have been a member of one of the largest United States delegations ever, to attend a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly. At that 28th session of the assembly, the question of NATO's future formed the basis for much of our discussion. I would like to insert in the record my closing remarks at this session, for they pertain directly to the issue of troop withdrawal.

We conclude this session debating the topic "is NATO Still Valid?" But, in fact, this question has formed the basis of our discussions for the entire week, because at present the answer in not perceived as being self-evident.

Our discussions have showed that differences exist within the Atlantic Alliance community. We have explored them fully during the past week, as it is our privilege and duty as parliamentarians to do.

Differences, of course, are not a new phenomenon among us. We have always had differences. They are rooted in geography. Our European friends live in the same neighborhood as the Soviet Union; the continental United States is protected by two great oceans, although it should not be forgotten that the seas between Alaska and Siberia narrow to only three miles.

Each NATO nation has made significant contributions to the strength and purpose of the alliance. I need remind no one in this chamber that the nations of Europe provide 80 percent of the manpower, 75 percent of the ships, and 60 percent of the aircraft for their own defense.

Nor need I dwell on the vast resources the United States is devoting to the alliance and to alliance interests around the world. Senator Stevens noted in the military committee that:

"U.S troops stationed in Europe have increased by nearly 60,000 since congressional debates over NATO forces 10 years ago. . . . (Furthermore) Department of Defense figures show the United States spending for NATO has leaped from $78 billion in 1981 to $133 billion projected for 1983."

We have listened to each other. And we have heard each other. The United States entered INF and START talks in response to legitimate concerns being raised on both sides of the Atlantic. President Reagan is pursuing a Middle East Peace Plan incorporating many of the views of thoughtful Europeans. We have recently reached agreement on the subject of steel and we seem to be moving toward closer cooperation on East-West trade. Perhaps the most visible evidence of cooperation is in Lebanon, where Italian, French and American troops now keep the peace.

Despite these signs of progress, the road ahead remains difficult. We cannot divine Soviet intentions with any degree of confidence, but there is no doubt that Soviet military capabilities are expanding.

Next year, without agreement in Geneva, deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles is scheduled to begin. This deployment will take place at a time when the political pressures to reduce nuclear arsenals are very great.

Our road is made more difficult by the economic straits in which all members of the Atlantic community find themselves. Unemployment in my own country now stands at more than 10 percent, and this harsh reality fosters unwholesome protectionist sentiment.

It is within the context of our economic problems that I want to discuss one last point. My European friends ask me whether we are seeing resurgent Mansfieldism in the United States. We are not. Senator Mansfield, one of the truly noble men whom I have known, concluded that a quarter of a century after World War II it was time for U.S. troops to come home. The Mansfield Resolution was designed to do that—to bring the troops home. But it was never adopted.

Today, the debate is very different. We are not discussing troop withdrawal. We are discussing troop levels in the future. This is precisely the opposite of what Senator Mansfield was talking about.

On clear message of the American electorate in 1982 was that defense should grow, but that the rate of growth in military spending in the United States would have to slow down. The hard facts of the recession demand this. Inevitably, this requires adjustments in the resources that can be devoted to any one task. However, and this is the central point, even after these adjustments are made the level of our defense effort and the resources we are devoting to defense will be far greater than in the past.

Over the years Joseph Luns has had a stock answer to the question of how many troops NATO should have in Europe. He has said, "Don't ask me, ask Brezhnev!" He will have to amend the response to "ask Andropov," but the principle is the same. While there is a threat, we shall meet it. When the threat is finally and permanently dissolved, then and only then shall we go home. In the meantime, we shall stand by our resolve to defend not only our own soil, but the ideals of human rights and human freedom which invigorate and inspire the Atlantic Alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point the Chair would like to call upon Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in connection with MBFR, I would like to request that you give us a little bit of a view as to how you see that going. If either side or both sides really wanted an agreement, it would

seem to me that we could split the difference of the data base and have the agreement, but the differential at this point is that the data base, some 60,000 or 80,000 troops, is the sticky point.

Isn't it being used really as an excuse for a sticky point? If it really was a sticky point, each side would say, okay, we will call it 40,000, let's get an agreement. Why have we not gone down that route?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, I am glad you asked the question because it is certainly my view that in fact the data base question is one on which you cannot split the difference. If our objective is mutual and balanced force reductions to an equal level, the question of the data and the size of the forces engaged or involved is, it seems to me, absolutely crucial.

If we split the difference, we are in effect saying that, well, we are not convinced of our data; and we are convinced of our data, and if there is a disparity in the numbers when we finish, we will accept that fact. But the point is it would not at that point be a mutual or balanced force reduction.

Senator PELL. I don't recall if the figures were classified or not. Are they? The differential between the two sides.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I don't recall whether they are or not either, so I will hope they weren't.

Senator PELL. The differential is not a very significant portion of the total; would that be a correct statement?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Well, it is substantial, Senator. You referred to a figure that is not, I think, too far off.

Senator PELL. Okay. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

I have just one question. Recently there has been some press reporting on what already has been a sophisticated argument about how best to interdict reinforcement capabilities of the Soviets in the case of attack. According to these reports new tactics, maybe even a new doctrine altogether of army operations in Europe, might bring about more successful results with fewer persons, and through so-called conventional means as opposed to nuclear means. Indeed, a very long article in the New York Times magazine section goes into this this past Sunday in perhaps the largest public exposition of this idea.

Now, what would be the effect of the Appropriations Committee changes that we are discussing today upon that new concept? I ask you first of all to characterize how far along that concept is, and secondly, what this means to the troop reduction issue, because it may be necessary to argue more extensive what we are doing if we are to rebut challenges to that change.

Mr. BADER. Senator, the new concept is still premised—and it is important that everyone understand this, including our European allies—the new concept is still premised on NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defense. The chiefs of state, heads of government agreed at Bonn that they wanted NATO to study this question of utilization of new technologies to interdict Soviet second and third echelon forces, to increase the conventional capability, to raise the nuclear balance.

Secretary Weinberger tomorrow will present to his allies in Brussels a U.S. paper that conceptually outlines what type of systems and concepts the allies could consider using in utilizing these new technologies for that purpose. As far as what effect does some of the reduction that we have been discussing today have on that, indirectly, significantly because part of the message that Bonn was attempting to signal was that there was an agreement to enhance the conventional capability, some of the moves that had been proposed would in effect reduce our conventional capability at a time that we were trying to get the Europeans to agree with the need to increase it.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate the point that you have made. I don't want to initiate an argument today over whether we ought to go purely conventional or whether the nuclear option ought to remain at all, but clearly for many for whom that is a very important issue, the movement toward tactics that stress the conventional means and indeed suggest even a defense of Europe through conventional means is a very important item.

The fact, as you say, Secretary Weinberger is even tomorrow going to be discussing this and fleshing it out somewhat more is, I think, an important fact that probably most of the public does not understand. Maybe many legislators have not comprehended it, and this particular argument we are discussing today as part of this hearing intrudes at this moment, maybe before we have a better idea of how theoretically or conceptually we might be moving down the trail. This is my purpose, just for the sake of the hearing, of raising that so that our record might be more complete, and I appreciate your response.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Senator, if I might just comment to reinforce a point that Mr. Bader made, which is the new concepts are still based on the basis of flexible response, and it would be, I think, wrong for our European allies or for the American public to come to the conclusion that we believe that you can defend Europe exclusively through conventional means if the flexible response approach still pertains, no matter what the new approach means in terms of a strengthened conventional defense.

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Eagleburger, Mr. Bader, we appreciate very much your coming before the committee and for your testimony today. You always are most forthcoming and interesting and provocative, and we are grateful to both of you.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR. The hearing is adjourned.

[Additional questions and answers follows:]

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY

Question 1. The specialty metals restriction in this year's Appropriations Bill is not as sweeping as the one approved by the Appropriations Committee last year since it would authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive the "Buy America" Act to permit the importation of specialty metals *if* they are contained in foreign-manufactured weapons systems.

Why, then, is the Administration opposed to this provision?

Answer. We oppose it in part because it appears to prohibit us from buying components of domestically developed and produced weapons systems. In addition, because non-weapon defense products are still involved, the specialty metals amendment would still not allow U.S. firms to accept for DOD many high technology goods

(e.g., machine tools, generators, and non-weapon defense products) as the foreign exchange offset for the purchase of U.S. military equipment. Such offset arrangements are increasingly an essential part of military sales.

By restricting European access to our markets, the United States will put at risk the trans-Atlantic arms trade with our Allies that has always run heavily in our favor (e.g., the 1980 U.S. defense trade balance with Europe ran 6 to 1 in our favor with a trade surplus of $1.8 billion.)

In addition, we would be going back on our commitment to expand the trans-Atlantic arms trade—the so-called "two-way street"—designed to reduce duplication of military systems, increase NATO standardization/interoperability and reduce the overall cost of defense.

The U.S. specialty metals industry stands to lose more from a constricted market in Europe for U.S. military equipment with its high specialty metals content than it would gain from the absence of a waiver for imports from our Allies.

Moreover, the Senate bill's restrictive provision on specialty metals contradicts the Roth, Glenn, Nunn amendment contained in the fiscal year 1983 DOD Authorization Bill which establishes the objective of an inter-Alliance defense industry.

With respect to the anti-dumping cases which may have influenced this legislation, I wish to emphasize that the countries most affected by this amendment are either not involved or only marginally involved. Administrative procedures exist within the Department of Commerce for settling trade problems. In addition, GATT has a mechanism for adjudicating unfair practices. The specialty metals restrictions undercut these established, internationally accepted procedures. European parliaments have already discussed passing similar "buy European" provisions should these restrictions remain in effect.

Question 2. What United States-European defense co-operation programs would be imperiled or affected if it (the specialty metal provision) is adopted?

Answer. The provision would undercut virtually every co-production and offset agreement that we have with our Allies and friends, by severely curtailing the ability to identify acceptable offsets for sale by the other country. Prime examples of this are the F–18 sales agreements with Spain, Canada and Australia. These agreements contain stiff financial penalties should U.S. manufacturers fail to meet their offset commitments. Similarly the Swiss have indicated that the specialty metals provision could be detrimental to the prospective sale of the M–1 tank.

Question 3. To what extent would our defense trade agreement with Canada be undercut?

Answer. To a serious degree. A large proportion of Canadian sales to the United States under the Defense Production Sharing Agreement involve at least some specialty metal content. Inability to maintain some kind of rough balance in defense trade between our two countries would vitiate a stated goal of the DPSA and could provoke Canada to re-examine the entire program.

Question 4. What U.S. military exports to Europe could be affected if the Europeans elected to impose reciprocal restrictions?

Answer. In addition to specific examples I have given, I must stress that most if not all of our military exports to Europe would be imperiled, precisely because the Europeans cannot afford to keep buying large amounts of U.S. military weapons and equipment if they are unable to maintain an acceptable reverse flow of "offset" sales to us.

Question 5. To what degree do the Europeans regard the repudiation of this proposal as central to the future of the "two way street" approach to defense cooperation?

Answer. European governments have voiced strong opposition to the specialty metals provision and have made it perfectly clear that the repudiation of this proposal is central to the future of the "two way street" approach to defense cooperation. European concern has been voiced at high governmental levels of almost every European country.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the hearing was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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